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and the effects of monetary policy on asset prices and welfare. The environment 
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no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements. The liquidity of the real 
asset is endogenized by introducing an informational asymmetry in regard to its 
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inﬂ  ation is not too high. The illiquidity premium paid to the real asset tends to 
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It is a well-accepted notion that assets are valued not only for their future expected dividend streams but also
for the liquidity services they provide.1 A case in point is ￿at money, which derives all its value from its role
as a medium of exchange. Other assets combine an income stream with some degree of moneyness, e.g., assets
included in the monetary aggregates can easily be transformed into means of payment, government securities
or land can serve as collateral for credit transactions, some stocks can be liquidated at low transaction costs.
The recognition that some assets have a special role in facilitating trades has important implications for
macroeconomics. As shown by Marshall (1992), Bansal and Coleman (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), and
Lagos (2006), among others, it helps understand asset pricing anomalies, and the transmission of monetary
policy to assets￿returns. A common approach, however, is to take as exogenous the ease with which assets
are traded. These shortcuts are undesirable. They occult the crucial link between the liquidity of an asset
and its intrinsic characteristics. Moreover, treating the liquidity of assets as exogenous subjects the model
to the Lucas critique￿ the degree of moneyness of an asset is likely to depend on the stance of monetary
policy￿ which makes it ill-equipped for policy analysis.
The aim of this paper is to provide a monetary theory of asset liquidity￿ one that emphasizes the role of
assets in payment arrangements￿ and to explore the implications of the theory for the relationship between
assets￿intrinsic characteristics and liquidity, and the e⁄ects of monetary policy on asset prices and welfare.
Following the literature pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), this paper considers economies where
some trades occur within bilateral meetings, and a double-coincidence-of-wants problem makes the use of a
medium of exchange necessary. Such environments o⁄er a parsimonious way of generating an endogenous
demand for liquid assets. I consider an economy where two assets coexist, ￿at money and a real asset, and
no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements. Without additional frictions, all forms of wealth are
equally good as means of payment, and agents are indi⁄erent between which asset to spend or to accept.
In order to overcome this indeterminacy, I assume that the liquidity di⁄erential between ￿at money and
the real asset stems from an informational asymmetry in regard to the fundamental value of the real asset.
Speci￿cally, agents paying with the real asset are better informed about its future performance than agents
who receive it, which makes it costly to trade.
1The theoretical and empirical literature on asset pricing and liquidity is surveyed in Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen
(2005). For a review of the literature which is more directly relevant to this paper, see Section 1.1.
2A key insight of the theory is that the risk-free asset, ￿at money in our context, is a strictly preferred
means of payment in the following sense. In order to ￿nance their consumption opportunities, individuals
spend their cash ￿rst, and they use their real assets only if their currency holdings are depleted. Moreover,
individuals retain a fraction of their real asset holdings even when their consumption is ine¢ ciently low. As
a consequence of the illiquidity of the real asset, a monetary equilibrium exists￿ one where ￿at money is
valued￿ irrespective of the quantity of the real asset, provided that in￿ ation is not too high.
A major insight of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) was to show that the acceptability of a good depends
on its storage cost as well as other fundamentals (e.g., the pattern of specialization) and beliefs. In the
same vein, this paper relates the liquidity of the real asset, as apprehended by its transaction velocity, to its
dividend process. The asset becomes more illiquid as the dispersion of the dividends across states increases.
This relationship between the intrinsic characteristics of an asset and its liquidity is illustrated in a rather
dramatic way when the real asset has no value in some state. In this case, the real asset becomes fully
illiquid and, in the absence of ￿at money, all trades shut down. The model also shows that an increase in
the supply of the real asset reduces its liquidity value, and raises its rate of return.
A long-lasting challenge of monetary theory￿ the central issue of the pure theory of money, according
to Hicks (1935)￿ is to explain why ￿at money is held when there are capital goods with a higher rate of
return. As noticed by Mehra and Prescott (1985), this rate-of-return dominance puzzle echoes the equity
premium puzzle￿ the excessively large di⁄erence between the rate of return of equity and risk-free government
liabilities. In the model developed in this paper, individuals exhibit a strict preference for currency, which
manifests itself by a rate-of-return di⁄erential between ￿at money (which can readily be reinterpreted as a
risk-free bond) and the real asset. The illiquidity premium paid to the real asset is positive even though
agents are risk-neutral with respect to their consumption of the dividend good. Moreover, it tends to increase
as the asset becomes riskier and more abundant.
This paper borrows some innovations from recent monetary theory (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005) to allow
for money growth and in￿ ation while keeping the model tractable. As a consequence, the model delivers
insights for the linkages between monetary policy and asset prices. Monetary policy a⁄ects the real asset￿ s
return when the supply of assets is not too large, and in￿ ation is in some intermediate range. An increase
in in￿ ation reduces the rate of return of the most liquid asset, and it induces a reallocation of individuals￿
portfolios towards the real asset. Consequently, the model predicts a negative relationship between in￿ ation
3and assets￿expected returns. The optimal monetary policy is such that the asset price is driven down to its
fundamental value given by its dividend stream, and the real asset is illiquid, i.e., its transaction velocity (in
some states) and liquidity premium are zero.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 provides a review of the relevant literature. The envi-
ronment is described in Section 2 and the social optimum is characterized in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes
the bargaining game under incomplete information. Section 5 embeds the bargaining game into a general
equilibrium structure and studies the e⁄ects of policy and fundamentals on asset liquidity.
1.1 Related literature
The idea of explaining asset liquidity by a private information problem is omnipresent in both the ￿nance and
the monetary literature. Asymmetries of informations are used to endogeneize transaction costs in ￿nancial
markets (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), security design (e.g., DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1999),
and capital structure choices (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984). The monetary literature has resorted to private
information problems to explain the role of money when goods are of unknown quality (e.g., Williamson
and Wright, 1994; Banarjee and Maskin, 1996), when individuals have some private information about their
ability to repay their debt (e.g., Jafarey and Rupert, 2001).2
A distinctive feature of my environment is the presence of multiple assets traded in bilateral meetings
under private information. In the same vein, Velde, Weber and Wright (1999) consider a model with two
indivisible commodity monies to account for Gresham￿ s law. Hopenhayn and Werner (1996) study a three-
period nonmonetary game with indivisible assets. The tradeability of an asset depends on the endogenous
decision of uninformed agents to accept it, and more tradeable assets exhibit a lower rate of return. Golosov,
Lorenzoni, and Tsyvinski (2008) adopt the same ingredients but focus on the transmission of information
through decentralized trading, and its implications for long-run e¢ ciency and the value of information.
My paper provides foundations for the trading restrictions that have been imposed in some recent models
that have ￿at money coexisting with other assets. A number of papers, e.g., Aruoba and Wright (2003),
Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2007), Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (2007), and Telyukova and Wright
(2007), follow Freeman (1985) and assume that any asset, except money, can be costlessly counterfeited.
2Berentsen and Rocheteau (2004) introduce a moral hazard similar to Williamson and Wright (1994) into a model with
divisible money. The "counterfeit" consumption good is perishable, it has no value, and only a pooling mechanism is considered.
Li (1995) constructs a search model, in which there is quality uncertainty about commodity monies.
4As a result, these other assets will not be used as a medium of exchange.3 Lagos (2006) studies a similar
environment where one-period risk-free bonds coexist with risky capital, and he restricts the use of capital
goods as means of payment in a fraction of the meetings.4
Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2007) and Kim and Lee (2008) further this argument in the context of
search monetary models where claims on capital can be counterfeited at no cost, and can only be authenti-
cated in a fraction of the meetings. In Lester et al., this fraction of meetings is endogeneized by assuming
that agents can invest in a technology to recognize claims on capital. Rocheteau (2008) investigates the case
where counterfeits are produced at a positive cost, and shows that the lack of recognizability manifests itself
by an endogenous upper bound on the transfer of assets in uninformed matches.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) also use moral hazard considerations to explain the partial illiquidity of
capital. They assume that the transfer of ownership of capital is not instantaneous so that an agent can
steal a fraction of his capital before the transfer is e⁄ective. Similarly, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998, 2001)
develop a corporate ￿nance approach to liquidity, where a moral hazard problem prevents claims on corporate
assets from being written. Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) provide an alternative explanation for why capital
may not be perfectly liquid: ￿there may be di⁄erent qualities of capital, and buyers may be less informed
than sellers so that there is adverse selection in the second-hand market.￿This is the avenue I follow in this
paper.5
In accordance with the Wallace (1996) dictum, no restrictions on the use of assets as means of payment
are made. In the same vein, Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996), Wallace (1996, 2000) and Cone (2005)
emphasize asset divisibility, or lack of divisibility, to explain the coexistence of money and interest-bearing
assets, and the liquidity structure of asset yields.6 Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) and Geromichalos, Licari,
and Suarez-Lledo (2007) study a model where divisible money and capital compete as means of payment.
3Aruoba and Wright (2003) and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2007) also refer to the lack of portability of capital goods
to justify the assumption that capital cannot be used as means of payment in decentralized markets. Telyukova and Wright
(2007, Section 4) lay down an extension of their model with "Lucas trees," in which agents pay a ￿xed cost if they use their
real assets as means of payment.
4Lagos (2006) studies ￿rst a version of the model where the use of Lucas￿trees as means of payment is unrestricted. The
trading restriction is introduced to allow the model to match the equity premium in the data. Shi (2004) adopts a similar
assumption in a search model with ￿at money and nominal bonds.
5Similarly, Zhu (2006, Section 4) discusses how one could introduce capital into his overlapping-generations model with
search, and he argues that to maintain the transaction role of money, "one could assume some private information about the
quality of capital, similar to the private information problem on the quality of goods in Williamson and Wright (1994)."
6In contrast to Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996), Shi (2004) and Zhu and Wallace (2007), this paper is not an attempt
to explain the coexistence of ￿at money and risk-free government bonds. All the analysis could be done by substituting ￿at
currency by risk-free government bonds.
5In contrast to my model, there is complete information about the value of the real asset. In terms of the
results, money is useful provided that the capital stock in the economy is small, and if money and capital
coexist they have the same rate of return. In my model, the presence of money is always useful irrespective
of the size of the capital stock, and if money and capital coexist, then capital dominates money in its rate
of return.
2 Environment
The environment is similar to the one in Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Time is discrete, starts at t = 0,
and continues forever. Each period has two subperiods: a morning, where trades occur in a decentralized
market (DM), followed by an afternoon, where trades take place in a competitive market (CM). There is
a continuum of in￿nitely-lived agents divided into two types, called buyers and sellers, who di⁄er in terms
of when they produce and consume. The labels buyers and sellers indicate agents￿roles in the DM. Let
B denote the set of buyers, S the set of sellers, and J = B [ S. The measures of buyers and sellers are













Buyers and sellers can both produce and consume in the CM. In the DM, however, buyers only consume,
while sellers only produce. This heterogeneity will generate a temporal double-coincidence problem. The





t [xt ￿ ‘t + u(qt)]; (1)
where xt is the CM consumption of period t, ‘t is the CM disutility of work, qt is the DM consumption,
and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a discount factor. The utility function u(q) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, u(0) = 0,
u0(0) = 1, u0(q) > 0, and u00(q) < 0. The production technology in the CM is linear with labor as the only
input, yt = ‘t.





t [xt ￿ ‘t ￿ c(qt)]; (2)
where qt is the DM production. The cost function c(q) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, c(0) = c0(0) = 0,
c0(q) > 0, c00(q) ￿ 0, and c(q) = u(q) for some q > 0. Let q￿ denote the solution to u0(q￿) = c0(q￿).
At the beginning of the CM, each buyer is endowed with A > 0 units of a one-period-lived real asset.
Because of the absence of wealth e⁄ects, who receives the endowment of real assets is irrelevant for the
allocations. The asset is divisible, uncounterfeitable, and durable over its lifetime. Each unit of the period-t
asset yields ￿t+1 units of CM-output delivered in the CM of t + 1, and it fully depreciates subsequently.
The real dividend can take two values, ￿t+1 2 f￿‘;￿hg, where 0 < ￿‘ < ￿h. The dividend shocks ￿t are
independent across time with ￿h = Pr[￿t = ￿h] 2 (0;1) and ￿‘ = 1 ￿ ￿h. Denote ￿ ￿ = ￿h￿h + ￿‘￿‘.7
Fiat money is durable, perfectly divisible, and it can be held in any nonnegative amount. The quantity
of money per buyer in the DM of period t is denoted Mt. It grows at a constant gross rate, ￿ ￿ Mt+1=Mt,
where ￿ > ￿. New money is injected, or withdrawn if ￿ < 1, by lump-sum transfers, (￿ ￿ 1)Mt, or taxes if
￿ < 1, to the buyers in the CM.8
In the CM, there is a competitive market where agents can trade goods, ￿at money, and the real asset.
In the DM, each seller is matched bilaterally with a buyer drawn at random from B. The buyer makes an
o⁄er that the seller accepts or rejects. If the o⁄er is accepted, then the trade is implemented. All trades in
7In Rocheteau (2007, Appendix D) I show that the model can be generalized to allow for more than two private signals.
Also, the case where the asset is long-lived complicates signi￿cantly the proof for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, but it does
not a⁄ect the main insights.
8If ￿ < 1, the government can force all buyers to pay taxes in the CM. However, it has no enforcement power in the DM.
In a related model, Andolfatto (2007) considers the case where the government has limited coercion power￿ it cannot con￿scate
output and cannot force agents to work￿ and agents can avoid paying taxes by not accumulating money balances. He shows
that if agents are su¢ ciently impatient, then the Friedman rule is not incentive-feasible, i.e., there is an induced lower bound
on de￿ation. Also, I restrict my attention to constant money growth rates. One could consider an environment with stochastic
in￿ation, and assume that agents are asymmetrically informed about the future value of money.
7the DM are quid pro quo, and matched agents can transfer any nonnegative quantity of DM-output and any
quantity of their asset holdings. Agents can only trade the physical asset, and not claims on future output.
In order to guarantee that there is an essential role for a medium of exchange, there is no public record of
individuals￿trading histories, and agents cannot commit.9
An informational asymmetry about the value of the real asset is introduced as follows. Buyers who enter
the DM in period t receive a perfectly informative signal about the dividend of the real asset, ￿t. Sellers, in
contrast, only learn the realization of the dividend in the CM of the same period.10 An advantage of having
the real asset traded in bilateral meetings in the DM, besides being a realistic feature of many asset markets,
is that it prevents the price from revealing the buyers￿information at no cost.
3 Social optimum
Consider a social planner who chooses an allocation in order to maximize the sum of the lifetime expected
utilities of all agents in the economy. The planner has full command over the resources of the economy,
but it has no private information about the future value of the asset, i.e., it observes the realization of the
dividend shock, ￿t, at the beginning of the CM in period t.
Let Mt denote the set of bilateral matches (j;j0) composed of one buyer j 2 B and one seller j0 2 S in















fu[qt(j)] ￿ c[qt(j0)]gd(j;j0): (3)
The ￿rst integral on the right side of (3) corresponds to the consumption net of the disutility of work for all
agents from t = 0 onwards. The second term is buyers￿consumption net of sellers￿disutility of production






‘t(j)dj + A￿t; 8t ￿ 0 (4)
qt(j) ￿ qt(j0); 8(j;j0) 2 Mt; 8t ￿ 0: (5)
9If trading histories were publicly observable, then some good allocations could be implemented through the threat of trigger
strategies. See Kocherlakota (1998) for a detailed presentation of this argument.
10There are several ways one can interpret this informational asymmetry. One can think of a seller as consolidating the
roles of a dealer of assets and a producer. In accordance with the market micro-structure literature, the dealer is uninformed
about the future value of the asset (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Alternatively, one could adopt the assumption of Plantin
(2008) that agents acquire some private information about the value of an asset by holding it. This assumption is relevant for
assets that are not traded publicly, such as securitized pools of loans. In my model, sellers have no strict incentives to hold the
asset, even if they could learn its future dividend in the DM, while buyers have a liquidity motive to hold the asset. Alternative
information structures could be considered, e.g., a fraction of buyers and a fraction of sellers are informed. Provided that buyers
know whether sellers are informed or not, the model remains tractable.
8The feasibility constraint (4) requires agents￿ CM-consumption in period t to be at most equal to the
aggregate production in that period, including the output generated by the stock of real assets, ￿tA. The
feasibility condition (5) indicates that the buyer￿ s consumption in a bilateral match is no greater than the
seller￿ s production in that match.
Since there is no state variable that links the subperiods, the planner￿ s problem can be rewritten as a










fu[qt(j)] ￿ c[qt(j0)]gd(j;j0) s.t. (5) (7)
The planner is indi⁄erent on how to allocate the CM-goods between agents. The optimal consumption and
production in bilateral matches satisfy qt(j) = qt(j0) = q￿ for all (j;j0) 2 Mt.
4 Payments under private information
I focus on steady-state equilibria where the gross rate of return of ￿at money is ￿￿1. In order to de￿ne the
payo⁄s in the bargaining game, it is useful to derive ￿rst some properties of the value functions in the CM.
Let Wb(z;a;￿) denote the value function of a buyer at the beginning of the CM with a portfolio of z real




xt ￿ ‘t + ￿EV b (z0;a0;￿t+1)
￿
(8)
s.t. xt + ￿z0 + ￿ta0 = ‘t + ￿tat + zt + Tt + ￿tA; (9)
where V b(z;a;￿) is the value function of the buyer in the DM, ￿t is the price of the real asset in terms of
period￿t CM output, Tt the lump-sum transfer of real balances by the government, and the expectation
is taken with respect to the future dividend state ￿t+1. According to (8), each buyer chooses his net
consumption and his portfolio in order to maximize his expected lifetime utility subject to the budget
constraint (9). In order to hold z0 units of real balances next period the buyer must invest in ￿z0 units in
the current period. Substitute xt ￿ ‘t = ￿tat + zt ￿ ￿z0 + ￿t(A ￿ a0) + Tt from (9) into (8) to obtain
Wb(zt;at;￿t) = ￿tat + zt + Tt + ￿tA + max
z0;a0
￿
￿￿z0 ￿ ￿ta0 + ￿
￿
￿hV b (z0;a0;￿h) + ￿‘V b (z0;a0;￿‘)
￿￿
: (10)
The buyer￿ s value function in the CM is linear in his wealth. Moreover, a buyer￿ s portfolio choice is inde-
pendent of his initial portfolio when he entered the period.
9Following a similar reasoning, the expected lifetime utility of a seller at the beginning of period t is given
by
Ws(zt;at;￿t) = ￿tat + zt + max
z0;a0 f￿￿z0 ￿ ￿ta0 + ￿V s (z0;a0)g; (11)
where V s (z;a) is the value function of the seller upon entering the DM. Recall that the seller has no private
information about the future dividend state.
In the rest of the section, I consider the bargaining game between a buyer holding a portfolio composed
of ab units of the real assets and zb units of real balances, and a seller with a portfolio of as units of the
real asset and zs units of real balances. The bargaining game has the structure of a signaling game.11 A
strategy for the buyer speci￿es an o⁄er (q;d;￿) 2 R+ ￿[￿as;ab]￿[￿zs;zb], where q is the output produced
by the seller, d is the transfer of real asset by the buyer, and ￿ the transfer of real balances, as a function
of the buyer￿ s type (i.e., his private information about the future dividend of the real asset). A strategy for
the seller is an acceptance rule that speci￿es a set A ￿ R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] of acceptable o⁄ers.
The buyer￿ s payo⁄ in the dividend state ￿ is
￿
u(q) + Wb ￿
zb ￿ ￿;ab ￿ d;￿
￿￿




where IA(q;d;￿) is an indicator function that is equal to one if (q;d;￿) 2 A. If an o⁄er is accepted, then
the buyer enjoys his utility of consumption in the DM, u(q), but he forgoes d units of the real asset and ￿
units of real balances. Using the linearity of the buyer￿ s value function, and omitting the constant terms,
the buyer￿ s payo⁄ can be expressed as his surplus [u(q) ￿ ￿d ￿ ￿]IA(q;d;￿).
Similarly, the seller￿ s (Bernoulli) payo⁄ function is
[￿c(q) + Ws (zs + ￿;as + d;￿)]IA(q;d;￿) + Ws (zs;as;￿)[1 ￿ IA(q;d;￿)];
and his surplus is [￿c(q) + d￿ + ￿]IA(q;d;￿). In order to accept or reject an o⁄er, the seller will have to
form expectations about the dividend of the real asset. He will do so by using the o⁄er (q;d;￿) to update his
prior belief. Let ￿(q;d;￿) 2 [0;1] represent the updated belief of a seller that the buyer holds a high-dividend
asset (￿ = ￿h). Then, E￿ [￿] = ￿(q;d;￿)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿‘.
For a given belief system, the set of acceptable o⁄ers for a seller is
A(￿) =
￿
(q;d;￿) 2 R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] : ￿c(q) + f￿(q;d;￿)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿‘gd + ￿ ￿ 0
￿
: (12)
11See Appendix B for a more detailed presentation of signaling games.
10For an o⁄er to be acceptable, the seller￿ s disutility of production in the DM, ￿c(q), must be compensated
by his expected utility in the next CM, E￿ [￿]d + ￿. I adopt a tie-breaking rule according to which a seller
agrees to any o⁄er that makes him indi⁄erent between accepting or rejecting a trade.12 The problem of a
buyer holding an asset of quality ￿ is then
max
q;d;￿
[u(q) ￿ ￿d ￿ ￿]IA(q;d;￿) s.t. (q;d;￿) 2 R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb]: (13)
The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.13 An equilibrium of the bargaining game is
a pro￿le of strategies for the buyer and the seller, and a belief system ￿. If (q;d;￿) is an o⁄er made in
equilibrium, then ￿(q;d;￿) is derived from the seller￿ s prior belief according to Bayes￿ s rule. Since there is
no discipline for out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the equilibrium concept is re￿ned by using the Intuitive Criterion
of Cho and Kreps (1987).14 Denote Ub
h the surplus of an h-type buyer and Ub
‘ the surplus of an ‘-type buyer
in a proposed equilibrium of the bargaining game. This proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if
there is an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) 2 R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] and a buyer￿ s type ￿ 2 f‘;hg such
that the following is true:
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿ ~ d ￿ ~ ￿ > Ub
￿ (14)
u(~ q) ￿ ￿￿￿ ~ d ￿ ~ ￿ < Ub
￿￿ (15)
￿c(~ q) + ￿￿ ~ d + ~ ￿ ￿ 0; (16)
where f￿￿g = f‘;hgnf￿g. According to (14), the o⁄er (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) would make a ￿-type buyer strictly better
o⁄ if it were accepted. According to (15), the o⁄er (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) would make the ￿￿-type buyer strictly worse o⁄.
According to (16), the o⁄er is acceptable provided that the seller believes it comes from a ￿￿type.
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium of the bargaining game is a pair of strategies and a belief system, h[q(￿),d(￿),￿(￿)], A;￿i,
12A similar tie-breaking assumption is used in Rubinstein (1985, Assumption B-3). It is made so that the set of acceptable
o⁄ers is closed, and the buyer￿ s problem has a solution.
13In the context of a signaling game, the concepts of sequential equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium are equivalent.
14The Intuitive Criterion is a re￿nement supported by much of the signalling literature. An equilibrium that fails the
Intuitive Criterion gives an outcome that is not strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). See Riley
(2001) for a survey of the applications of the Intuitive Criterion (and other re￿nements) in various contexts. It has been
used in monetary theory by Nosal and Wallace (2007); in the corporate ￿nance literature by Noe (1989) and DeMarzo and
Du¢ e (1999); in bargaining theory by Rubinstein (1985, Assumption B-1); and, recently, in the literature on global games by
Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006). In our context, the Intuitive Criterion has the additional advantage of preserving the
tractability of the model once the bargaining game is embodied in the general equilibrium structure in Section 5. For sake
of completeness, the model is also analyzed under the alternative re￿nement from Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite
(1993) in Appendix C. It is also worth noticing that for some portfolios (e.g., zb ￿ c(q￿)) the outcome of any perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the bargaining game is unique.
11such that: (i) [q(￿);d(￿);￿(￿)] is solution to (13) with ￿ 2 f￿‘;￿hg; (ii) A is given by (12); (iii) ￿ :
R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] ! [0;1] satis￿es Bayes￿rule whenever possible, and the Intuitive Criterion.
The next Lemma narrows the set of possible equilibria by showing that there cannot be a pooling o⁄er
in any equilibrium.15
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, there is no pooling o⁄er with d 6= 0.
Any equilibrium in which there are transfers of real assets between buyers and sellers is separating. The
logic of the argument goes as follows. Suppose there is a pooling o⁄er such that d > 0. The buyer in
the high-dividend state has the possibility to signal the quality of the real asset by choosing an o⁄er that
would raise his payo⁄ relative to the proposed equilibrium, but that would hurt buyers in the low-dividend
state. Typically, the trade involves a lower consumption and a smaller transfer of real asset compared to the
equilibrium o⁄er, but also a better price for the asset. (See Section 4.1 for a graphical illustration of this
argument.) Reciprocally, if d < 0, then the buyer in the low-dividend state can reduce his consumption and
the quantity of assets he buys from the seller in order to signal the low quality of the asset.
The next Lemma characterizes the equilibrium o⁄ers.
Lemma 2 Any o⁄er made by a buyer in the low-dividend state is such that
(q‘;d‘;￿‘) 2 argmax
q;￿;d
[u(q) ￿ ￿‘d ￿ ￿] (17)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿‘d + ￿ ￿ 0 (18)
￿zs ￿ ￿ ￿ zb; 0 ￿ d ￿ ab: (19)
Any o⁄er made by a buyer in the high-dividend state is such that
(qh;dh;￿h) 2 argmax
q;￿;d
[u(q) ￿ ￿hd ￿ ￿] (20)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿hd + ￿ ￿ 0 (21)
u(q) ￿ ￿‘d ￿ ￿ ￿ u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) (22)
￿zs ￿ ￿ ￿ zb; ￿as ￿ d ￿ ab: (23)
15It should be clear from the proof of Lemma 1 that the same result would go through if buyers could use mixed strategies.
12The only way an ‘-type buyer can achieve a higher payo⁄ than the one he would get in a game with
complete information is by making an o⁄er with d‘ > 0 that a seller would attribute to an h-type buyer with
positive probability, which has been ruled out by Lemma 1. Hence, buyers in the low-dividend state make
their complete information o⁄er (which is always acceptable, provided that d‘ ￿ 0, irrespective of sellers￿
beliefs). The solution to (17)-(19) is
q‘ = q￿;
￿‘d‘ + ￿‘ = c(q￿);
if ￿‘ab +zb ￿ c(q￿). Notice from (19) that the buyer in the low state is restricted not to buy assets from the
seller, d‘ ￿ 0. This guarantees that buyers in the high state have no incentives to mimic the o⁄er made by
buyers in the low state. If ￿‘ab + zb < c(q￿), then
￿‘ = zb;
d‘ = ab;
q‘ = c￿1 ￿
￿‘ab + zb￿
:
According to the Intuitive Criterion, an h-type buyer can always increase his payo⁄as long as by so doing
he does not give incentives to an ‘-type buyer to imitate him. Hence, from (20)-(23), the buyer maximizes
his surplus subject to the participation constraint of the seller, where the seller has the correct belief that
he faces an h-type buyer, and subject to the incentive-compatibility condition according to which an ‘-type
buyer does not want to mimic the o⁄er of an h-type buyer.
A belief system consistent with the o⁄ers in Lemma 2 is such that sellers attribute all o⁄ers that would
raise the payo⁄ of buyers in the low-dividend state relative to their complete information payo⁄ to ‘-type
buyers, and all other out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers to h-type buyers. O⁄ers that violate (22) also violate (18),
and since they are attributed to ‘-type buyers, they are rejected.
Proposition 1 (A pecking order theory of payments)
Consider a match between a buyer holding a portfolio (zb;ab) and a seller holding a portfolio (zs;as).
There is a solution (qh;dh;￿h) to (20)-(23).
131. If zb ￿ c(q￿), then
qh = q￿ (24)
￿h + ￿hdh = c(q￿) (25)
dh ￿ 0: (26)
2. If zb < c(q￿), then ￿h = zb and (qh;dh) 2 [0;q‘] ￿ [0;ab] is the unique solution to:
￿hdh = c(qh) ￿ zb (27)








= u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘); (28)








Proposition 1 o⁄ers a pecking order theory of payment choices: agents with a consumption opportunity
￿nance it with cash ￿rst, and they use their risky assets as a last resort.16 If buyers hold enough real balances
to buy q￿ (zb ￿ c(q￿)), then they do not transfer any real asset to the sellers. In this sense, ￿at money is a
preferred means of payment. Even when buyers do not have enough wealth to buy the surplus-maximizing
level of output, they choose not to spend all their capital goods. By retaining a fraction of their real asset
holdings, buyers signal the high future dividend of the asset, and hence they secure better terms of trade.17
The fraction ￿h ￿ dh=ab of his real asset holdings that a buyer spends in the DM is a function of his
portfolio and the characteristics of the dividend process. If u(q) = 2
p
q and c(q) = q, then the closed-form
























￿hab if zb ￿ q￿
= 0 otherwise,
where q‘ = min
￿
1;￿‘ab + zb￿
. This expression points to the di⁄erences between the approach in this paper
and the approaches of Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Lagos (2006). In Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), agents
16The term ￿pecking order￿was coined by Myers (1984, p.581). It describes the predictions of models of capital structure
choices under private information. According to the pecking order theory, ￿rms with an investment opportunity prefer internal
￿nance (nondistributed dividends). If external ￿nance is required, then they issue the safest security ￿rst, and they use equity
as a last resort.
17This result is reminiscent to some of the ￿ndings of the liquidity-based model of security design from DeMarzo and Du¢ e
(1999). They consider the problem faced by a ￿rm that needs to raise funds by issuing a security backed by real assets. The
issuer has private information regarding the distribution of cash ￿ows of the underlying assets. Using the Intuitive Criterion,
they show that a signaling equilibrium exists in which the seller receives a high price for the security by retaining some fraction
of the issue.
14can only sell a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of their illiquid asset (capital) to raise funds; in Lagos (2006), agents can
use their illiquid asset ("Lucas￿trees") in a fraction of ￿ of the matches. In both cases, the parameter ￿ is
exogenous. In contrast, in my model buyers spend a fraction ￿h of their capital when the dividend is high,
where ￿h is a function of the intrinsic characteristics of the asset (￿‘ and ￿h) and the composition of the
portfolio held by the buyer (zb and ab). Hence, the (il)liquidity of the real asset depends on its intrinsic
characteristics, as well as policy, since the buyer￿ s portfolio will be a⁄ected by the rate of return of ￿at
money.
Proposition 2 (Asset liquidity and fundamentals)
Assume zb < c(q￿) and ab > 0. Then:
1. @￿h
@￿h < 0 and @￿h
@￿‘ > 0.
2. lim￿‘!0 ￿h = 0.
The propensity to spend the real asset in the high-dividend state increases with the size of the low-state
dividend, ￿‘, and it decreases with ￿h. To understand this result, notice from (22) that ‘-type buyers enjoy
an informational rent (the di⁄erence between the buyer￿ s surplus in the low state and the buyer￿ s surplus in
the high state) equal to (￿h ￿ ￿‘)dh > 0. As ￿‘ gets closer to ￿h, this informational rent shrinks, and the
incentive-compatibility constraint is relaxed, which improves the liquidity of the asset in the high-dividend
state.18 Conversely, as ￿h ￿ ￿‘ increases, the informational asymmetries become more severe, which makes
the incentive-compatibiliy condition more binding. In the case where the dividend in the low state approaches
0, the adverse selection problem is so severe that the real asset ceases to be traded. Fiat money becomes the
only means of payment.19
Proposition 3 (Payments and portfolio composition)







18This result is related to the ￿ndings in Banerjee and Maskin (1996), according to which the good that serves as the medium
of exchange is the one for which the discrepancy between qualities is smallest.
19Strictly speaking, the ‘￿type buyers can still use the real asset in payments, but because ￿‘ tends to 0 the amount of
output they buy with it approaches 0.





￿‘ u0(qh)=c0(qh) ￿ 1
2 (0;1): (30)
As the buyer￿ s real balances increase, the transfer of real assets (expressed in CM output) decreases. The
buyer uses his additional real balances to reduce dh, thereby relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint
(22). This dependence of ￿h on zb will o⁄er a channel through which monetary policy a⁄ects the liquidity
of the real asset.
According to (30), the marginal propensity of a buyer to spend his real asset in the high-dividend state is
less than one. Provided that ￿‘ab +zb < c(q￿), an additional unit of asset increases the surplus of the buyer
in the low-dividend state, and hence it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint in the high-dividend
state, which allows the buyer to spend a fraction of his marginal asset. If ￿‘ab + zb > c(q￿), then q‘ = q￿
and @dh=@ab = 0. In this case, the liquidity needs in the low-dividend state are satiated and, as a result, an
additional unit of the real asset does not a⁄ect the incentive-compatibility constraint, and hence the terms
of trade, in the high-dividend state.
4.1 Nonmonetary equilibrium
In the following, I describe the case where ￿at money is not valued, zs = zb = 0. This special case provides
some graphical intuition for the results, and some insights on the role of ￿at money.
As shown in Lemma 1, there is no equilibrium of the bargaining game with a pooling o⁄er. The proof
is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2. Consider an equilibrium with a pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d) with ￿ d > 0.
(An o⁄er with ￿ d < 0 would not be acceptable since the seller would receive nothing in exchange for some
output and some asset.) The surpluses of the two types of buyers at the proposed equilibrium are denoted
Ub
‘ ￿ u(￿ q) ￿ ￿‘ ￿ d and Ub
h ￿ u(￿ q) ￿ ￿h ￿ d. The indi⁄erence curves Ub
‘ and Ub
h in Figure 2 represent the set of
o⁄ers (q;d) that generate the equilibrium surpluses. They exhibit a single-crossing property, which is key to
obtain a separating equilibrium. The participation constraint of a seller who believes he is facing an h-type
buyer is represented by the frontier Us
h ￿ f(q;d) : ￿c(q) + ￿hd = 0g. The o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d) is located above Us
h
since it is accepted when ￿ < 1. The shaded area indicates the set of o⁄ers that raise the utility of an h-type
buyer (o⁄ers to the right of Ub
h), but reduce the utility of an ‘-type buyer (o⁄ers to the left of Ub
‘), and are
acceptable by sellers provided that ￿ = 1 (o⁄ers above Us
h). These o⁄ers satisfy (14)-(16) with ￿ = h so
that the proposed equilibrium with a pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d) violates the Intuitive Criterion. In order to separate
16himself, an h-type buyer reduces his DM consumption as well as his transfer of asset to the seller. Provided
that the reduction in q is su¢ ciently large relative to the reduction in d, an ‘-type buyer would not choose


















Pooling  equilibrium Separating  equilibrium
Offers  violating  the  Intuitive  Criterion
l d
Acceptable  offers
Offers  attributed  to  L-type  buyers
Figure 2: Pooling vs separating equilibria
The equilibrium o⁄ers are as described in Lemma 2. The buyer in the low-dividend state makes his
complete information o⁄er while the buyer in the high-divided state makes the least-cost separating o⁄er.
Buyers￿o⁄ers are illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2 in the case where the constraint d‘ ￿ ab does
not bind. The o⁄er of the ‘-type buyer is at the tangency point between the iso-surplus curve of the seller,
Us
‘ ￿ ￿c(q)+￿‘d = 0, and the iso-surplus curve of the buyer, Ub
‘. In order to satisfy the seller￿ s participation
constraint and the incentive-compatibility condition, type-h buyers make o⁄ers to the left of Ub
‘, and above
Us
h. The utility-maximizing o⁄er is at the intersection of the two curves. As shown in the Figure, and
proved in Proposition 1, qh < q‘ ￿ q￿. Buyers in the high-dividend state always consume less than in the
low-dividend state. Despite this ine¢ ciently low consumption, buyers retain a fraction of their real asset
holdings (Proposition 1).
Turn to the normative properties of the equilibrium. If ￿‘ab ￿ c(q￿), then the value of the low-dividend
asset is large enough to trade the ￿rst-best quantity, q￿. Under complete information, the economy would
17achieve its ￿rst best. In contrast, if the quality of the asset is private information, then the equilibrium
allocation is ine¢ cient. The ‘-type buyers consume q￿, but h-type buyers consume qh < q￿. If ￿‘ab < c(q￿),
then the quantities traded in the DM are ine¢ ciently low in all matches, i.e., qh < q‘ < q￿.20 The ine¢ ciency
induced by the private information problem can be shown in a rather dramatic way by looking at the case
where ￿‘ approaches 0, i.e., the asset is valueless in one state. Then, from Proposition 2, ￿h goes to 0 so
that buyers do not spend any of their real asset holdings, and the market shuts down (qh;q‘ ! 0).
As revealed by Proposition 1, by holding real balances the buyer can overcome the ine¢ ciency associated
with the private information problem. In particular, if zb ￿ c(q￿), then the ￿rst-best allocation is obtained,
and buyers do not use the real asset as means of payment in the high-dividend state.
5 Asset prices, liquidity, and monetary policy
This section incorporates the bargaining game studied in Section 4 into the general equilibrium structure laid
down in Section 2, and it investigates the implications of the model for the relationship between monetary
policy, asset liquidity, and asset returns. The analysis of the bargaining game is simpli￿ed by assuming that
the buyer￿ s and seller￿ s portfolios are common knowledge in a match in the DM.21
The sequence of events is as follows. (See Figure 1.) Agents make a portfolio choice in the CM. At
the beginning of the subsequent period, buyers receive a private and fully informative signal about the
future dividend of the real asset, while sellers are uninformed. Then, buyers get matched with sellers. An
implication of this timing is that the buyer￿ s portfolio does not convey any information about the buyer￿ s
private information. The outcome of the bargaining game between a buyer and a seller in the DM is as
described in Section 4. From Proposition 1, the seller￿ s portfolio is irrelevant for the determination of the
agents￿surpluses in the DM. Hence, the terms of trade [q(zb;ab;￿);￿(zb;ab;￿);d(zb;ab;￿)] are functions of
the buyer￿ s portfolio and his private signal. They solve (17)-(19) if ￿ = ￿‘, and (20)-(23) if ￿ = ￿h.22
20One could also ask whether there exists an incentive-feasible trading mechanism that implements the ￿rst-best allocation in
the absence of ￿at money. Consider a direct mechanism that maps the buyer￿ s type ￿ into an o⁄er (q;d). Suppose qh = q‘ = q￿.
Then, incentive-compatibility requires dh = d‘ = d. So the outcome is pooling. The trade (q￿;d) satis￿es the seller￿ s individual
rationality constraint if ￿c(q￿) + ￿ ￿d ￿ 0. Similarly, buyers are willing to participate if u(q￿) ￿ ￿hd ￿ 0. Thus, the ￿rst-best is
incentive-feasible provided that ab ￿ c(q￿)=￿ ￿ and ￿h=￿ ￿ ￿ u(q￿)=c(q￿), i.e., there is no shortage of the asset, and the discrepancy
between the dividends in the di⁄erent states is not too large.
21This assumption is made in order to avoid having to specify the agents￿beliefs regarding the portfolio held by their partner
in the match. It will be shown in the following that the surplus functions in the DM are weakly monotone increasing in the
agent￿ s asset holdings. Hence, if agents had the possibility to show their portfolios in a pre-stage of the bargaining game, I
conjecture that there would be an equilibrium where they would do so truthfully.
22The solutions to (17)-(19) and (20)-(23) might not be unique, e.g., if zb > c(q￿). With no loss, one can select a solution
such that d ￿ 0 since it is feasible irrespective of the seller￿ s portfolio.
18The missing block of the model is the determination of agents￿portfolio choices. The expected lifetime
utility of a buyer entering the DM with z units of real balances, a units of the real asset, and a private signal
￿, is
V b(z;a;￿) = u[q(z;a;￿)] + Wb [z ￿ ￿(z;a;￿);a ￿ d(z;a;￿);￿]: (31)
Using the linearity of Wb, (31) can be reexpressed as
V b(z;a;￿￿) = S￿ (z;a) + z + ￿￿a + Wb (0;0;￿￿); ￿ 2 f‘;hg; (32)
where S￿ (z;a) is the buyer￿ s surplus in the DM when the dividend state is ￿, i.e.,
S￿ (z;a) ￿ u[q(z;a;￿￿)] ￿ ￿￿d(z;a;￿￿) ￿ ￿(z;a;￿￿) for ￿ 2 f‘;hg:
Substituting V b by its expression given by (32) into (10), the buyer￿ s portfolio problem in the CM reduces
to





￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
a + ￿hSh(z;a) + ￿‘S‘(z;a)
￿
; 8j 2 B; (33)
where i = (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿ is the cost of holding real balances, and (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿ is the cost of investing in the real
asset. According to (33), buyers choose their portfolios in order to maximize their expected surplus in the
DM, net of the cost of holding real balances and capital.
Since sellers obtain no surplus from the DM trades, their expected lifetime utility upon entering the DM
is
V s(z;a) = EWs (z;a;￿) = z + ￿ ￿a + EWs (0;0;￿): (34)
Substitute V s by its expression given by (34) into (11) to reduce the seller￿ s portfolio problem to










; 8j 2 S: (35)
Finally, the clearing of the asset market implies
Z
j2J
a(j)dj = A: (36)
In the following, Z ￿
R
j2J z(j)dj represents aggregate real balances, and Mt+1=Z is the price level in the
CM of period t.
De￿nition 2 An equilibrium is a list of portfolios, terms of trade in the DM, the price of capital, and
aggregate real balances, h[z(j);a(j)]j2J;[q(￿);d(￿);￿(￿)];￿;Zi such that:
19(i) [z(j);a(j)] is solution to (33) for all j 2 B and (35) for all j 2 S;
(ii) For all (z;a) 2 R2+, [q(z;a;￿);d(z;a;￿);￿(z;a;￿)] is solution to (17)-(19) if ￿ = ￿‘ and (20)-(23)
if ￿ = ￿h;




The next two lemmas characterize the buyers￿and sellers￿portfolio choices.
Lemma 3 (Sellers￿portfolio choices)
Consider the seller￿ s portfolio problem in (35).
1. For all i > 0, z = 0.
2. If ￿ > ￿￿ ￿, then a = 0. If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿, then a 2 [0;1). If ￿ < ￿￿ ￿, then (35) has no solution.
The proof, which is immediate from (35), is omitted. Holding ￿at money is costly, due to in￿ ation and
discounting, and sellers get no surplus from their trades in the DM. Hence, they hold no real balances.




a denote the partial derivatives of the surplus function for ￿ 2 f‘;hg. These quantities
represent the liquidity values of ￿at money and the real asset, at the margin, in the DM in the dividend
state ￿.
Lemma 4 (Buyers￿portfolio choices)




z(z;a) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if z > 0, (37)
￿









































If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿, then z is uniquely determined, and a 2 [
c(q
￿)￿z
￿‘ ;1). If ￿ < ￿￿ ￿, then there is no solution to
(33).
If the price of the real asset is greater than its fundamental value, i.e., ￿￿￿￿ ￿ > 0, then the composition
of the buyer￿ s optimal portfolio is unique. This result is a consequence of Lemma 1 according to which ￿at
money and the real asset are imperfect substitutes, i.e., ￿at money is a preferred means of payment.
From (37) and (38), for an asset to be held, its cost must be equal to the expected marginal bene￿t that
the asset confers in the DM, which is measured by the partial derivative of the surplus function (S
￿
k with
￿ 2 f‘;hg and k 2 fa;zg). According to (39), a marginal unit of asset (expressed in terms of CM output)
allows the buyer to purchase 1=c0(q‘) units of DM output when the dividend state is low; this additional
output is valued according to the marginal surplus of the match, u0(q‘) ￿ c0(q‘). The ￿rst term in brackets
on the right side of (40) is the liquidity value of real balances in the high-dividend state, in the complete
information economy. It is the analog of (39). This term is multiplied by 1+
@(￿hdh)
@zb < 1 (see (29)) because,
in the private information economy, the buyer with an additional unit of real balances reduces his transfer
of real asset in order to mitigate the informational asymmetry in the match. Similarly, the ￿rst two terms
on the right side of (41) correspond to the liquidity value of the real asset in the high-dividend state in the
complete information economy. This liquidity component is multiplied by the marginal propensity to spend
the real asset, @dh
@ab 2 [0;1), which is less than one in the private information economy (see (30)).
If the real asset is priced according to its fundamental value, ￿ = ￿￿ ￿, then the buyer￿ s choice of the
real asset is indeterminate: buyers accumulate enough wealth to buy the ￿rst-best quantity of output when
￿ = ￿‘. The choice of real balances, however, is always unique.
The next proposition proves the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium allocations and prices)
211. An equilibrium exists, and it is such that ￿, Z, and (q‘;qh;dh;￿h) are uniquely determined. Moreover,
￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿;￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘].
2. For all A > 0, there is a i0(A) > 0 such that the equilibrium is monetary (Z > 0) if and only if
i < i0(A).
An equilibrium exists, and it is essentially unique. Interestingly, the equilibrium has a simple recursive
structure. Aggregate real balances, Z, are determined from (37) where a = A. Given Z, the asset price, ￿,
comes from (38). Given ￿, one can use Lemmas 3 and 4 to determine the agents￿portfolios. Given (zb;ab)
and (zs;as), Lemma 2 generates the allocation in the DM.
In Figure 3, Ad(￿) represents the aggregate demand for the real asset. From the proof of Proposition
4, Ad(￿) is upper-hemi continuous, and any selection from Ad(￿) is decreasing. Hence, the asset price is
unique, at the intersection of A and Ad(￿).
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Figure 3: Aggregate demand of the real asset, Ad(￿).
The equilibrium is monetary for all A provided that the cost of holding real balances, i, is su¢ ciently
























, which is bounded away from
220 since qh < q￿. Money is useful, even for large values of A, because it overcomes the illiquidity of the real
asset in the high-dividend state, i.e., it relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint faced by buyers. In
contrast, in the complete information economy, ￿at money is valued only if the stock of the real asset is not
large enough to allow buyers to trade q￿ when ￿ = ￿‘.23 (See Figure 4).
From (38)-(41), the equilibrium price of the real asset is
















The ￿rst term on the right side of (43) is the fundamental value of the asset, and the last two terms are
the liquidity values in the DM in the di⁄erent states. In order to isolate the contribution of the private
information friction to the liquidity of the asset, one can rewrite the asset price as ￿ = ￿￿ ￿
￿































In the complete information economy, ￿ = ￿￿ ￿
￿
1 + L1￿
.24 The private information friction adds the compo-
nent L2, which is negative. This negative contribution results from the last term on the right side of (45),
@dh
@ab ￿ 1 < 0, according to which the buyer￿ s marginal propensity to spend the real asset is less than one.
The next Proposition determines the condition under which the liquidity premium, de￿ned as L = L1+L2,
is positive, and the expected return of the real asset, denoted Ra = ￿ ￿=￿, is less than the discount rate.
Proposition 5 (Liquidity premium and asset returns)
For all i > 0, there is ￿ A(i) 2 [0;c(q￿)=￿‘] such that:
1. For all A ￿ ￿ A(i), L = 0 and Ra = ￿
￿1.
2. For all A < ￿ A(i), L > 0 and Ra < ￿
￿1. Moreover, @L
@A < 0 and @Ra
@A > 0.
The liquidity premium emerges if the real asset is relatively scarce, i.e., A < c(q￿)=￿‘, and in￿ ation is
su¢ ciently large, i > ￿ A￿1(A). If these conditions hold, buyers￿wealth in the low dividend state is not large










. The di⁄erence with
the right side of (42) stems from the last term in brackets, 1+￿h
@dh
@zb , which captures the fact that when the buyer accumulates






24See Appendix D for a derivation of the asset price in the complete information economy.
23enough to allow buyers to ask for the ￿rst-best quantity, i.e., q‘ < q￿. An increase in the supply of the real
asset reduces the liquidity premium, and raises the rate of return of the real asset.25 On the contrary, if the
real asset is su¢ ciently abundant to allow buyers to consume q￿ in the low-dividend state, then its price is
equal to its fundamental value￿ which is independent of monetary policy￿ and its expected rate of return is
equal to the gross discount rate.26
The next proposition describes the e⁄ects of monetary policy on the liquidity and expected return of
the real asset. The liquidity of the real asset is measured by its transaction velocity (or turnover) in the
high-dividend state, Vh ￿ dh=A.27
Proposition 6 (Monetary policy and asset prices)
1. If i < i0(A), then dVh=di > 0.
2. If i < i0(A) and A < ￿ A(i), then dL=di > 0 and dRa=di < 0.
3. As i ! 0, Vh ! 0, L ! 0 and Ra ! ￿
￿1.
A lower rate of return of ￿at money induces buyers to hold fewer real balances, and to turn to the real
asset as a means of payment. As a consequence, the turnover of the real asset (Vh) increases. Because
the real asset is in ￿xed supply, an increase in the aggregate demand for the real asset translates into a
higher price. As a corollary, the model predicts a negative relationship between in￿ ation and expected asset
returns.28
As i tends to zero, then q‘ and qh approach q￿. Hence, the optimal policy drives the cost of holding
money to 0. In the high-dividend state, buyers trade with money only (dh ! 0), while in the low-dividend
25The result according to which the size of the liquidity premium depends on the supply of the asset is consistent with
the ￿ndings of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) for Treasury debt. One could replace ￿at money in my model by
default-free, real bonds. An increase in the supply of bonds would then reduce the liquidity premia of all assets.
26The expression for ￿ A(i) is provided in the proof of Proposition 5. If i < i0(A), i.e., ￿at money is valued, it can be shown
that ￿ A(i) is strictly increasing.
27This de￿nition of asset liquidity is also the one used in Wallace (2000). Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) have argued that
velocity is not always a good measure of moneyness. They showed that objects can have a high transactions velocity even
though they are accepted in bilateral trade with low probability, because the endogenous stock of the object is low. To avoid
this concern, the stock of the asset in my model is kept ￿xed. Since the payment arrangement in the low-dividend state is
indeterminate when ￿ = ￿￿ ￿, I focus on the velocity in the high-dividend state. The velocity of the asset in the low-dividend
state is equal to 1 if A < ￿ A(i). In the case where A > ￿ A(i), one could adopt the convention that buyers use their money ￿rst,
i.e., V‘ = [c(q￿) ￿ z]=￿‘A and dV‘=di > 0 provided that i < i0(A).
28The negative relationship between equity returns and in￿ation has been extensively documented. See Marshall (1992)
for references. Theoretical models of this relationship are provided by Danthine and Donaldson (1986) and Marshall (1992).
Both models assume the liquidity services of ￿at money through a money-in-the-utility-function assumption or a shopping time
technology.
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Figure 4: Liquidity premium and the value of money
state buyers are indi⁄erent between using money or the real asset as means of payment.29 The price of the
real asset converges to its fundamental value (￿ ! ￿￿ ￿).
The next Proposition looks at the implications of the model for the structure of asset returns. The rate of
return of ￿at money is Rz = ￿￿1, and the rate of return of the real asset is Ra = ￿ ￿=￿ = ￿
￿1 ￿
1 + L1 + L2￿￿1
.
Proposition 7 (Distribution of asset returns)
In any monetary equilibrium, Ra > Rz.
The expected rate of return of the real asset is always greater than the rate of return of ￿at money
(provided that it is valued). Equivalently, the liquidity return of ￿at money in the DM is greater than the
liquidity return of the real asset, i > L1+L2. The rate-of-return di⁄erential between ￿at money and the real
asset is not generated by restrictions on payment arrangements, as in cash-in-advance models. Moreover,
because of linear preferences with respect to the CM consumption, the riskiness of the real asset does not
29Since the equilibrium correspondence is only upper-hemi continuous at i = 0, the focus is on the equilibria that are obtained
by taking the limit as i approaches 0. There are several ways to get the optimal monetary policy to di⁄er from the Friedman
rule. If one assumes limited coercion power by the government, then the Friedman rule might not be incentive-feasible. See
footnote 8. Also, the Friedman rule may not longer be optimal if agents have strictly concave preferences and face idiosyncratic
trading shocks. See Zhu (2006) and Waller (2007).
25a⁄ect its rate of return through the standard risk-aversion component of the pricing kernel.30 Risk matters
here for two reasons.
First, the riskiness of the real asset generates a covariance between its dividend and the marginal value of
wealth in the DM (see (44)). This covariance term is negative in the complete information economy because
a high dividend is associated with a high wealth. As a consequence, the liquidity return of the real asset is
lower than the liquidity return of ￿at money, which explains why a rate-of-return dominance pattern can also
emerge from a complete information economy.31 In contrast, this covariance term is positive in the private
information economy because the DM output is lower in the high-dividend state relative to the low-dividend
state. (See Proposition 1.)
Second, the riskiness of the real asset makes the informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers
relevant. It is because the dividend of the real asset can take di⁄erent values, and because buyers have
some private information about the future value of the asset, that ￿at money becomes a preferred means
of payment. The private information problem reduces the liquidity premium that accrues to the real asset,
and it increases the rate of return di⁄erential between ￿at money and risky capital. To see this, notice from
Proposition 4 that the liquidity premium of the real asset, (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿ ￿, is bounded above by ￿‘i=￿ ￿, which
tends to zero as the dividend in the low state becomes small. Moreover, provided that the stock of the real
asset is su¢ ciently large (A > ￿ A(i)), the rate of return of the real asset is maximum and equal to the gross
discount rate, Ra = ￿
￿1. In this case, the rate of return of the asset is the one that would prevail in a
cash-in-advance economy where the real asset cannot serve as means of payment in the DM.32 In contrast,
under complete information the rate of return of the real asset in any monetary equilibrium is bounded away
from ￿
￿1.
The next Proposition investigates how the discrepancy between the dividend in di⁄erent states a⁄ects
the structure of asset returns.
Proposition 8 (Asset prices and fundamentals)
30Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) also distinguish the security motive for holding an asset and risk aversion.
They de￿ne surety as "a value investors place on a sure cash-￿ow above and beyond what would be implied by the pricing
kernel."
31See the Appendix D.
32These results can have interesting empirical implications for asset pricing puzzles (provided that one reinterprets currency
as risk-free bonds). Lagos (2006) showed that a standard search model of exchange can generate an equity premium as large
as in the data (for plausible degrees of risk aversion) provided that equity is partially illiquid. While the illiquidity arises from
legal or institutional restrictions in Lagos (2006), it is directly related to the dividend process here.




c0[c￿1(￿ ￿A)] ￿ 1.
Under these conditions, Ra = Rz = ￿￿1.
2. If ￿‘ ! 0, then a monetary equilibrium always exists. Moreover, Vh ! 0, Ra ! ￿
￿1 > Rz.
If the real asset is safe, then a monetary equilibrium exists only if there is a shortage of the real asset
to be used as means of payment. The rate of return of the real asset is then equal to the rate of return
of ￿at money. Graphically, the vertical portion of the curve i0(A) in Figure 4 coincides with the vertical
axis. In contrast, if the dividend in the low state becomes very small, then the turnover of the asset in the
high-dividend state goes to 0, and its rate of return approaches its maximum given by the discount rate.
The Proposition above is complemented by a simple numerical example based on the following speci￿ca-
tions: u(q) = 2
p
q, c(q) = q, ￿ = 0:95, ￿‘ = 1 ￿ ￿, ￿h = 1 + ￿, ￿h = ￿‘ = 0:5 and A = 1. The mean of the
dividend is equal to 1 while its variance is ￿2. I consider the e⁄ects of a change in ￿ on the turnover of the
asset and its liquidity premium.
Figure 5: Asset liquidity
The left panel of Figure 5 represents the turnover of the asset in the high state, Vh = dh=A. As ￿
increases, the fraction of the asset that is used as means of payment in the high-dividend state decreases.
As ￿ approaches one, the real asset becomes fully illiquid, i.e., ￿at money is the only means of payment in
the DM.
27The right panel of Figure 5 plots the di⁄erence between the price of the asset and its fundamental value
as a fraction of the asset price,
￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ = 1￿￿Ra. Recall that the rate of return of ￿at money is constant and
equal to ￿￿1. If ￿ is close to 0 (i.e., the asset is safe), then the equilibrium is non-monetary. An increase
in the riskiness of the asset raises its liquidity value because the buyer￿ s wealth constraint tightens in the
low-dividend state. Above a threshold for ￿, ￿at money becomes valued. An increase in the riskiness of
the real asset makes ￿at money more valuable, and it reduces the liquidity value of the asset. The liquidity
premium tends to 0 as ￿ approaches one.33
6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to provide a monetary theory of asset liquidity that emphasizes the role
of assets in payment arrangements. The main ingredients of the model are the presence of multiple assets,
￿at money and risky equity, that are traded in both centralized and decentralized markets, and an informa-
tional asymmetry between agents paying with an asset, and agents receiving the asset. I have explored the
implications of the theory for the relationship between assets￿intrinsic characteristics and liquidity, and the
e⁄ects of monetary policy on asset prices and welfare.
A recurrent theme of this paper is that the liquidity of the real asset, measured either by its turnover or
by its liquidity premium, depends on the properties of its dividend process. An asset which is riskier tends
to be less liquid. In support of this ￿nding, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) argue that half of
the convenience yield of Treasury security relative to corporate bonds can be explained by a surety motive,
where surety is the ￿value investors place on a sure cash-￿ ow above and beyond what would be implied
by the pricing kernel￿ . Similarly, Longsta⁄, Mithal, and Neis (2005) ￿nd that the highest-rated corporate
bonds exhibit a lower yield spread relative to Treasury securities once the default component is accounted
for. Spiegel and Wang (2005) ￿nd a strong negative correlation between liquidity and idiosyncratic risk in
stock returns.
If one reinterprets ￿at money as risk-free government bonds, then the model has macroeconomic impli-
cations for the risk-free rate and equity premium puzzles. It predicts that the rate of return of government
33The negative relationship between liquidity and risk is consistent with Longsta⁄, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) who argue that assets that are less risky (e.g., Tresuriy securities or the highest grade
corporate bonds) have a higher liquidity (convenience) value. Also, Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005, p.47) argue that
is di¢ cult to distinguish empirically the e⁄ects of illiquidity and risk on stock returns because of a strong relationship between
the two.
28bonds is less than the rate of time preference, and risky equity commands a higher return than risk-free
bonds despite agents￿being risk-neutral. By introducing a more standard pricing kernel, Lagos (2006) shows
that a monetary model with exogenous liquidity constraints can generate the observed equity premium for
plausible measures of risk aversion. My model can relate the illiquidity of equity to its dividend process,
thereby providing a greater check on the theory.
My model also predicts a negative relationship between the liquidity component of asset returns and the
supply of assets. This is consistent with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) who ￿nd a negative
relationship between the yield spread between corporate bonds and Treasury securities and the U.S. gov-
ernment debt-to-GDP ratio, based on annual observations from 1925 to 2005. Interestingly, this aggregate
demand for Treasury debt is reminiscent to the aggregate money demand used by Lucas (2000) to assess the
welfare cost of in￿ ation.34 Microfounded models￿ such as the search-theoretic model I have been building
upon￿ that proved useful to assess the welfare cost of in￿ ation can also provide new insights for the social
value of liquid assets.
In terms of monetary policy, Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007),
and Lagos (2006) ￿nd that, in the absence of liquidity constraints, a monetary equilibrium ceases to exist
if the supply of assets is su¢ ciently large. In contrast, my model has the more realistic prediction that a
monetary equilibrium exists irrespective of the supply of assets, provided that the in￿ ation rate is not too
large. The rate of return of the asset is negatively correlated with in￿ ation, in accordance with Danthine
and Donaldson (1986) and Marshall (1992). In contrast to earlier works, my model can be used to relate the
in￿ ation-elasticity of the asset price to the characteristics of the asset.
The natural next step is to construct a calibrated version of the model incorporating more realistic
features, such as risk aversion, in￿nitely-lived assets, and a richer information structure. A more standard
pricing kernel could be obtained by adopting the three-sector model of Lagos (2006), or the overlapping-
generations model of Zhu (2008). Our approach could also be useful to revisit the relationship between
in￿ ation and capital, as in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2007). I leave these quantitative investigations of
the model to future research.
34Lucas found that the welfare cost of 10 per cent in￿ation is about 1 per cent of GDP per year. Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen found that ￿the value of the liquidity provided by the current level of Treasuries is around 0.95 per cent of
GDP per year￿.
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34A. Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof shows that any equilibrium with a pooling o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) can be dismissed
by the Intuitive Criterion. It distinguishes the case where ￿ d > 0 from the case where ￿ d < 0.
(i) Suppose ￿rst that ￿ d > 0. By de￿nition, the buyers￿payo⁄s at the proposed equilibrium are Ub
h =
u(￿ q) ￿ ￿h ￿ d ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 and Ub
‘ = u(￿ q) ￿ ￿‘ ￿ d ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0. A necessary condition for (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) to be acceptable when
￿(￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) < 1 is ￿c(￿ q) + ￿h ￿ d + ￿ ￿ > 0. De￿ne F ￿ R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] the subspace of R3 of feasible
o⁄ers. Let
O1 ￿ f(q;d;￿) 2 F : ￿c(q) + ￿hd + ￿ > 0g:
Then, O1 is open in F, and it contains (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿). Let
O2 ￿ f(q;d;￿) 2 F : ￿‘
￿￿ d ￿ d
￿
< [u(￿ q) ￿ ￿ ￿] ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿] < ￿h
￿￿ d ￿ d
￿
g:
Then, O2 is open in F, it is not empty, and its closure is O2 3 (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿).35 Consequently, any open ball centered
at (￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) has a non-empty intersection with O2. Moreover, by de￿nition of an open set, there exists a radius
" > 0 such that the open ball B((￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿);") ￿ O1, and hence B((￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿);") \ O2 6= ?. Consequently, there
is (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) 2 O1 \ O2 that satis￿es (14)-(16) with ￿ = h, and the proposed pooling equilibrium fails the
Intuitive Criterion.
(ii) Suppose next that ￿ d < 0. The participation constraint of the seller implies ￿ ￿ > 0. Since ￿ d < 0 and
￿(￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿) 2 (0;1) then
0 ￿ ￿c(￿ q) + ￿(￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿)￿h ￿ d +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(￿ q; ￿ d;￿ ￿)
￿
￿‘ ￿ d + ￿ ￿ < ￿c(￿ q) + ￿‘ ￿ d + ￿ ￿:
De￿ne
O1 ￿ f(q;d;￿) 2 F : ￿c(q) + ￿‘d + ￿ > 0g
O2 ￿ f(q;d;￿) 2 F : ￿h
￿￿ d ￿ d
￿
< [u(￿ q) ￿ ￿ ￿] ￿ [u(q) ￿ ￿] < ￿‘
￿￿ d ￿ d
￿
g:
In order to show that O2 6= ?, one can construct an o⁄er (q;d;￿) 2 F such that q = ￿ q, ￿ d￿d < 0, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < 0,
and ￿‘ < ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ d￿d < ￿h, where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿ d ￿ d can be made arbitrarily close to 0. By the same reasoning as in
35To show that O2 is not empty, one can construct an element (q;d;￿) 2 F such that ￿ = ￿ ￿ and ￿‘ <
u(￿ q)￿u(q)
￿ d￿d < ￿h where
u(￿ q) ￿ u(q) > 0 and ￿ d ￿ d > 0 can be made arbitrarily small. To show that (￿ q; ￿ d; ￿ ￿) is in the closure of O2, consider a sequence
f(qn;dn;￿n)g1
n=1 such that ￿n = ￿ ￿, u(￿ q)￿u(qn) > 0, ￿ d￿dn > 0 and ￿‘ <
u(￿ q)￿u(qn)
￿ d￿dn < ￿h for all n 2 N and (qn;dn) ! (￿ q; ￿ d).
All the terms of the sequence are in O2 and it converges to (￿ q; ￿ d; ￿ ￿).
35(i), there is (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) 2 O1 \O2 that satis￿es (14)-(16) with ￿ = ‘, and the proposed pooling equilibrium fails
the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) O⁄er by the ‘-type buyer. Provided that d ￿ 0, any o⁄er that satis￿es
(18) is acceptable since
￿c(q) + f￿(q;d;￿)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿‘gd + ￿ ￿ ￿c(q) + ￿‘d + ￿ ￿ 0;
for all ￿(q;d;￿) 2 [0;1]. Moreover, the complete information o⁄er is such that ￿‘d + ￿ ￿ 0, and hence the
requirement d ￿ 0 is not binding. Consequently, the complete information payo⁄ for the ‘-type buyer can
always be achieved. A payo⁄ strictly greater than the complete information payo⁄ is obtained only if (18)
is violated, i.e.,
￿c(q) + ￿‘d + ￿ < 0: (46)
But an o⁄er is acceptable if
￿c(q) + f￿(q;d;￿)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿‘gd + ￿ ￿ 0: (47)
From (46) and (47), ￿‘d < f￿(q;d;￿)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿‘gd, and hence d > 0 and ￿(q;d;￿) > 0. This has
been ruled out by Lemma 1.
Finally, I rule out o⁄ers such that d‘ < 0. The complete information o⁄er is consistent with d‘ < 0 if
and only if zb + ￿‘ab > c(q￿), in which case q‘ = q￿. The payo⁄ of an h-type buyer who o⁄ers (q‘;d‘;￿‘) is
u(q‘) ￿ ￿hd‘ ￿ ￿‘ = u(q￿) ￿ c(q￿) ￿ (￿h ￿ ￿‘)d‘ > u(q￿) ￿ c(q￿);
if d‘ < 0. So the h-type buyer could obtain more than the total surplus of the match, which would violate
the incentive-compatibility condition in any separating equilibrium.
(ii) O⁄er by the h-type buyer. Suppose there is an equilibrium where the ‘-type buyer achieves his
complete information payo⁄, Ub
‘ = u(q‘)￿c(q‘), and the expected payo⁄ of the h-type is Ub
h 2 [0; ￿ U), where
￿ U is the payo⁄ associated with the solution to (20)-(23). For " > 0, de￿ne U" as
U" = max
q;￿;d
[u(q) ￿ ￿hd ￿ ￿] (48)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿hd + ￿ ￿ 0 (49)
u(q) ￿ ￿‘d ￿ ￿ ￿ Ub
‘ ￿ " (50)
￿zs ￿ ￿ ￿ zb; ￿as ￿ d ￿ ab: (51)
36The set of acceptable and feasible o⁄ers is compact, and it is nonempty provided that " < Ub
‘. From the
Theorem of the Maximum, U" is continuous in ", and lim"!0 U" = ￿ U. Hence, there is an " > 0 such
that U" > Ub
h. The associated o⁄er satis￿es (14)-(16), i.e., the proposed equilibrium violates the Intuitive
Criterion.
Suppose that Ub
h > ￿ U. Then, either the seller￿ s participation constraint, (21), or the incentive-compatibility
constraint, (22), are violated. Suppose ￿c(q) + ￿hd + ￿ < 0. The o⁄er is acceptable if (47) holds, which
implies ￿hd < f￿(q;d;￿)￿h + [1 ￿ ￿(q;d;￿)]￿‘gd, and hence d < 0 and ￿(q;d;￿) < 1. This has been ruled
out by Lemma 1. If u(q) ￿ ￿‘d ￿ ￿ > Ub
‘, then ‘-type buyers can achieve a payo⁄ strictly greater than their
complete information payo⁄, which contradicts (i).
Finally, the solution to (20)-(23) is incentive-compatible since (q‘;d‘;￿‘) with d‘ ￿ 0 satis￿es (21) and
(22).
(iii) Beliefs.
A belief system consistent with the o⁄ers in Lemma 2 is such that ￿(qh;dh;￿h) = 1 and ￿(q‘;d‘;￿‘) = 0
if (qh;dh;￿h) 6= (q‘;d‘;￿‘), and ￿(qh;dh;￿h) = ￿h and ￿(q‘;d‘;￿‘) = ￿‘ if (qh;￿h) = (q‘;￿‘) and dh = d‘ = 0
(from Bayes￿rule). It will be established in Proposition 1 that the o⁄ers (qh;dh;￿h) and (q‘;d‘;￿‘) are
distinct unless dh = d‘ = 0. For out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers,
￿(q;d;￿) = 1 if (22) holds
= 0 otherwise.
O⁄ers that violate (22) also violate (18), and since they are attributed to ‘-type buyers, they are rejected.
Proof of Proposition 1. The buyer￿ s objective function in (20) is continuous, and it is maximized
over a non-empty, compact set. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, there is a solution to (20)-(23). If




= q‘, ￿h + ￿hdh = c(qh),
and dh ￿ 0. The incentive-compatibility condition (22) implies
u(qh) ￿ c(qh) + (￿h ￿ ￿‘)dh ￿ u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘);
which is satis￿ed. This solution is consistent with Parts 1 and 2 of the Proposition. In the following, I focus
on the case where ab > 0.
37Part 1 of the Proposition. I investigate in turn the conditions under which the constraints (21) and (22)





q‘. Since from (21) c(qh) = ￿hdh + ￿h, then (22) becomes
u(qh) ￿ c(qh) + dh(￿h ￿ ￿‘) ￿ u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘):
If zb < c(q￿), then dh > 0 and (22) is violated, which is a contradiction. If zb ￿ c(q￿), then qh = q‘ = q￿ and
the inequality above implies dh ￿ 0, as in Part 1 of the Proposition.
Second, suppose that the seller￿ s participation constraint (21) is slack. Substitute u(qh) by its expression









‘ + (￿h ￿ ￿‘)as;
and dh = ￿as. If as > 0, then u(qh) ￿ c(qh) ￿ Ub
h > Ub
‘ = u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘), which requires q‘ < q￿ and qh > q‘.
From (18) and (21), ￿hdh+￿h ￿ c(qh) > c(q‘) = zb+￿‘ab, and hence ￿h > zb+￿‘ab+￿has. This inequality
violates feasibility. If as = 0, then Ub
h = Ub
‘ = u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘). Since dh = 0, Ub
h ￿ max[u(q) ￿ ￿] subject to
￿c(q) + ￿ = 0. Hence, Ub
h = Ub
‘ if and only if zb ￿ c(q￿). In that case, qh = q￿ and ￿h = c(q￿), which is
consistent with Part 1 of the Proposition.
Part 2 of the Proposition. I show ￿rst that the constraint ￿h ￿ zb is binding when zb < c(q￿). If ￿h ￿ zb
is slack, then qh = q￿, dh ￿ 0 and ￿h + ￿hdh = c(q￿). This solution maximizes (20) subject to (21), and the
constraint dh ￿ 0 guarantees that (22) holds. However, ￿h ￿ c(q￿) is in contradiction with zb < c(q￿).
Since (21) is binding and ￿h = zb, dh is given by (27). Substitute dh by its expression into (22) at equality
to get (28). For all qh 2 [0;q‘] the left side of (28) is strictly increasing. It is nonpositive at qh = 0, and greater
than u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) at qh = q‘ if c(q‘) > zb. This last inequality holds from (17)-(19). Indeed, if zb < c(q￿),
then c(q‘) = min
￿
c(q￿);zb + ￿‘ab￿
> zb since I focus on the case ab > 0. Hence, there is a unique qh 2 (0;q‘)






is decreasing in qh
for any solution to (28). Hence, the unique solution in (0;q‘) delivers a maximum to the problem (20)-(23).
Given a unique qh, dh is determined by (27). Finally, c(qh) = zb + ￿hdh < c(q‘) = ￿‘ + ￿‘d‘ ￿ zb + ￿‘ab
implies dh < ab. From (28), qh < q‘ implies c(qh) ￿ zb > 0 and, from (27), dh > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.



































(ii) From (28), as ￿‘ approaches to 0 qh tends to the solution to
u(qh) ￿ zb = u(q‘) ￿ c(q‘) = u(q‘) ￿ zb;


















@zb ￿ 1, and hence (29). The assumption ab > 0 implies q‘ > qh (Proposition 1)
and
@(￿hdh)
@zb < 0. The expression for @dh
@ab in (30) is obtained by a similar reasoning.
Proof of Lemma 4. The following cases are distinguished: ￿ > ￿￿ ￿, ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ and ￿ < ￿￿ ￿.
(i) ￿ > ￿￿ ￿.
Equations (37) and (38) are the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to z and a of the problem (33). First,
compute the ￿rst and second partial derivatives and the cross-partial derivatives of the surplus functions
S‘(z;a) and Sh(z;a). From Lemma 2, S‘(z;a) = ^ S‘(z + ￿‘a) with
^ S‘(z + ￿‘a) = u ￿ c￿1(z + ￿‘a) ￿ z ￿ ￿‘a if z + ￿‘a < c(q￿)
= u(q￿) ￿ c(q￿) otherwise.
39Therefore, S‘
a = ￿‘ ^ S
0
‘, S‘
z = ^ S
0
‘, S‘
zz = ^ S
00
‘, S‘






‘. From Proposition 1, if z < c(q￿),
then qh solves (28), i.e.,






[c(qh) ￿ z] = ^ S‘(z + ￿‘a):



























dz > 0 for all z < c(q￿), and dqh
da > 0 for all (z;a) such that z + ￿‘a < c(q￿). From Proposition
1, the seller￿ s participation constraint (21) holds at equality so that Sh(z;a) = u(qh) ￿ c(qh). Hence,
Sh













a(z;a) = [u0(qh) ￿ c0(qh)]
dqh
da































































For all z < c(q￿), Sh
zz < 0. Consequently, the ￿rst leading principal minor of the Hessian matrix associated
with (33), ￿hSh
zz + ￿‘S‘
zz, is negative for all z < c(q￿).

























































































































> 0; 8qh ￿ q￿:
Hence, jHj > 0 for all z + ￿‘a < c(q￿).
I now show that there is a unique solution to (33). First, the solution to (33) is such that z+￿‘a ￿ c(q￿).
Suppose z + ￿‘a > c(q￿). Then, ^ S
0
‘ = 0 and Sh
a(z;a) = S‘
a(z;a) = 0. The ￿rst-order condition for a, (38),
implies a = 0. If z > c(q￿), then qh = q‘ = q￿ and hence Sh
z(z;a) = S‘
z(z;a) = 0. The ￿rst-order condition
for z, (37), implies z = 0. A contradiction.
So one can restrict (z;a) to the compact set f(z;a) 2 R2+ : z + ￿‘a ￿ c(q￿)g and, from the Theorem
of the Maximum, a solution to (33) exists, and it satis￿es the ￿rst-order conditions (37)-(38). Since H is
negative de￿nite for all (z;a) such that z + ￿‘a < c(q￿), i.e., the leading principal minors of H alternate in
sign with the ￿rst one being negative, the solution to (33) is unique.
(ii) ￿ = ￿￿ ￿.
From the ￿rst-order condition for a, (38), Sh
a(z;a) = S‘
a(z;a) = 0, which requires z + ￿‘a ￿ c(q￿). The







￿ 0; ￿ = ￿ if z > 0, (52)
41where I have used that ^ S
0
‘ = 0. From (28), qh(z) is implicitly de￿ned by






[c(qh) ￿ z] = u(q￿) ￿ c(q￿) if z < c(q￿); (53)
and qh(z) = q￿ if z ￿ c(q￿). For all z ￿ c(q￿), ￿(qh) = ￿(q￿) = 0, and (52) implies z = 0. A contradiction.
Since ￿0 < 0 and q0
h(z) > 0 for all z 2 (0;c(q￿)), and since the function on the left side of (52) is continuous




(iii) ￿ < ￿￿ ￿.
Since Sh
a(z;a) ￿ 0 and S‘
a(z;a) ￿ 0 there is no solution to the ￿rst-order condition for a, (38).
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, it establishes the existence and
uniqueness of the market-clearing price ￿. Second, it derives the condition for a monetary equilibrium.
Third, it characterizes the allocations in the DM.
(i) Existence and uniqueness of ￿.
De￿ne Ad(￿) ￿
nR
j2J a(j)dj : a(j) solution to (33) if j 2 B and to (35) if j 2 S
o
. If ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ then, from
Lemma 3, the solution to (35) is such that as = 0 and, from Lemma 4, there is a unique solution (zb;ab)
to the problem (33). Hence, Ad(￿) = fabg. Moreover, since (zb;ab) can be restricted to the compact set
f(z;a) 2 R2+ : z + ￿‘a ￿ c(q￿)g, and since the objective function in (33) is continuous, the Theorem of













where H = [Hij](i;j)2f1;2g2 is the Hessian matrix associated with (33). Since jHj > 0 (see proof of Lemma
















Consequently, for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿, dab=d￿ = H11
￿jHj < 0 where H11 = ￿hSh
zz + ￿‘S‘
zz. If the solution to (33) is such










So, Ad(￿) is decreasing provided that a > 0. Last, from (37)-(38), if Ad(￿) = f0g, then Ad(￿
0) = f0g for all
￿
0 > ￿. Moreover, Ad(￿) = f0g if ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘. To see this, rewrite (38) as
￿￿ + ￿￿ ￿
￿￿‘
+ ￿h￿(qh) ^ S
0
‘ + ￿‘ ^ S
0
‘ ￿ 0:
42From the comparison with (37), i.e.,
￿i + ￿h￿(qh) ^ S
0











￿￿‘ > i, then (38) holds with a strict inequality and ab = 0.






(from Lemma 4), where ^ z(i) is the






. In order to show that Ad(￿) is upper-hemi
continuous at ￿ = ￿￿ ￿, consider a sequence f￿ng1
n=0 such that ￿n > ￿￿ ￿ for all n 2 N and ￿n ! ￿￿ ￿. Then,
for all n 2 N the buyer￿ s portfolio choice, (ab
n;zb
n), is unique and such that ￿‘ab
n + zb
n < c(q￿). Moreover,
(37)-(38) being continuous, (ab
n;zb
n) converges to (zb
1;ab
1) such that ￿‘ab
1 + zb















1) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if ab
1 > 0.
Hence, zb
1 = ^ z(i) and ￿‘ab
1 + zb




￿‘ 2 Ad(￿￿ ￿).
To summarize: Ad(￿) is upper-hemi continuous, any selection from Ad(￿) is decreasing whenever a > 0,
Ad(￿) = f0g for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘ and 1 2 Ad(￿￿ ￿). Hence, there is a unique ￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿;￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘] such that
A 2 Ad(￿). (See Figure 3.)
(ii) Monetary equilibrium.
From Lemma 4, for given ￿ there is a unique zb solution to the buyer￿ s problem. Consequently, Z =
R
j2B z(j)dj = zb. Since A 2 Ad(￿), Z satis￿es (37) with a = A, i.e.,
￿i + ￿hSh
z(Z;A) + ￿‘S‘
z(Z;A) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if Z > 0:
Since Sh
zz < 0 for all Z < c(q￿), dZ
di < 0 whenever Z > 0, and there exists i0(A) = ￿hSh
z(0;A) + ￿‘S‘
z(0;A)
such that Z > 0 for all i < i0. Since Sh
z(0;A) < 1 and S‘









> 0 for all qh < q￿ (from Proposition 1), then i0(A) > 0.
(iii) DM allocations.
From (i) ￿ is unique. From Lemma 4, if ￿ > ￿￿ ￿, then there is a unique solution to (33). From Proposition
1, if ￿ = ￿h, then (qh;dh;￿h) is unique; if ￿ = ￿‘, then q‘ and ￿‘ +￿‘d‘ are uniquely determined. If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿,
then a(j) can vary across buyers and sellers but zb = Z is unique, and zb + ￿‘a(j) ￿ c(q￿) for all j 2 B (see
Lemma 4). Consequently, q‘ = q￿ and, from (28), qh is independent of a(j) for all j 2 B, and it solves (53).
43Proof of Proposition 5. De￿ne ￿ A(i) = [c(q￿) ￿ ^ z(i)]=￿‘ where ^ z(i) is the unique solution to (52)-(53).
As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, Ad(￿￿ ￿) = [ ￿ A(i);1) and Ad(￿) = fabg for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿, with ab < ￿ A(i).
Thus, from the market-clearing condition A 2 Ad(￿), if A ￿ ￿ A(i), then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ and Ra = ￿ ￿=￿ = ￿
￿1; If
A < ￿ A(i), then ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ and Ra = ￿ ￿=￿ < ￿
￿1. Finally, any selection from Ad(￿) is strictly decreasing in ￿
for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ (provided that 0 = 2 Ad(￿)). Consequently, the solution to A 2 Ad(￿) is such that d￿=dA < 0
for all A < ￿ A(i). Hence, dL
dA < 0 and dRa
dA > 0 for all A < ￿ A(i).
Proof of Proposition 6.














which is strictly positive if Z < c(q￿). (To see this, recall that q‘ > qh and Sh
zz < 0.) From (37), i > 0






























zz < 0 (from the proof of
Lemma 4), and
d￿
di > 0. This implies dL=di > 0 and dRa=di < 0.
(iii) From (37), as i ! 0, Sh
z;S‘
z ! 0 and hence qh;q‘ ! q￿ and Z ! c(q￿). From Lemma 1, dh ! 0 and
Vh ! 0. From (54), Sh
a;S‘
a ! 0 implies ￿ ! ￿￿ ￿.
Proof of Proposition 7. From (38),





















44Similarly, from (37), and after replacing Sh
z and S‘










+ ￿‘ ^ S
0
‘: (56)









































‘ [￿h￿(qh) + ￿‘]
￿
:
From (37), ￿(qh) > 0 (since Sh
z > 0) for all i > 0. Moreover, ￿‘ < ￿ ￿ < ￿h. Hence, Ra > Rz:




c0(q‘) ￿ 1 and, from (43), ￿ = ￿￿ ￿(1 + i) and Ra = ￿ ￿
￿ = ￿￿1. The condition for a monetary




c0[c￿1(￿ ￿A)] ￿ 1. The right
side of the inequality is strictly positive if and only if c￿1 (￿ ￿A) < q￿, i.e., ￿ ￿A < c(q￿).
(ii) From Proposition 2, as ￿‘ ! 0, then dh ! 0 and Vh = dh
A ! 0. From (37), the condition for the












= 1, then a monetary equilibrium always exists. As ￿‘ ! 0,
then Sh
a(Z;A);S‘




B. Re￿nements of sequential equilibrium
I describe two re￿nements of sequential equilibrium in the context of the bargaining game studied in Section
4: the Intuitive Criterion and the undefeated equilibrium.
A typical signaling game has the following structure. There are two players: a sender of information and
a receiver of information. In the context of the bargaining game in this paper, the sender is the buyer who
makes an o⁄er and the receiver is the seller who accepts or rejects the o⁄er. The timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws a type t for the sender according to some (commonly known) probability distribution
￿(t). Here, the set of types is T = f‘;hg and ￿(‘) = ￿‘ and ￿(h) = ￿h.
2. The sender (buyer) privately observes the type t, and he sends an o⁄er o to the receiver (seller). Here,
an o⁄er is a triple (q;d;￿) 2 R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] where q is the output, d is the transfer of the
real asset, and ￿ is the transfer of real balances.
3. The receiver observes the o⁄er o and takes an action r. Here, the set of actions is fY;Ng. If r = Y
then the o⁄er is accepted; If r = N then the o⁄er is rejected.
The payo⁄ of the buyer is Ub(t;o;r) = [u(q) ￿ ￿td ￿ ￿]Ifr=Y g. The payo⁄ of the seller is Us(t;o;r) =
[￿c(q) + ￿td + ￿]Ifr=Y g. After receiving the o⁄er o, the seller forms a posterior probability assessment over
the set of types of the buyer, ￿(tjo). The best response of the seller is





In the context of the bargaining game, the best response of the seller can be reexpressed as
BR(￿;o) = arg max
r2fY;Ng
[￿c(q) + [￿(hjo)￿h + ￿(‘jo)￿‘]d + ￿]Ifr=Y g:
I adopt the tie-breaking rule according to which r = Y whenever BR(￿;o) = fY;Ng.
Let o: T ! R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] denote a strategy for a buyer. It is a mapping from the set of
types to the set of feasible o⁄ers. Let r: R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] ! fY;Ng denote a strategy for a seller.
It is a mapping from the set of feasible o⁄ers to the set fY;Ng. A (pure strategy) sequential equilibrium is
a pro￿le of strategies (o￿;r￿) and a seller￿ s belief system, ￿
￿, such that the following is true.
461. For all t 2 T, o￿(t) 2 argmaxo0 Ub(t;o0;r￿(o0))
2. For all o, r￿(o) 2BR(￿
￿(o);o)
3. ￿
￿ satis￿es Bayes￿rule whenever possible
In the context of the bargaining game studied in Section 4, the buyer￿ s strategy can be simpli￿ed by
noticing the following. First, Ub(t;o;r￿(o)) = 0 for all o such that r￿(o) = N. Second, from the tie-breaking
rule, Ub(t;o;r￿(o)) = 0 and r￿(o) = Y if o = (0;0;0). Hence, with no loss, the buyer can choose an o⁄er
among those that are accepted by sellers, i.e.,
o￿(t) 2 argmax
o Ub(t;o;Y ) s.t. Y 2 BR(￿
￿(o);o):
The Intuitive Criterion
The Cho-Kreps (1987) re￿nement is based on the idea that out-of-equilibrium actions should never be
attributed to a type who would not bene￿t from it under any circumstances. For a subset K ￿ T, let





Suppose K = T = f‘;hg. Then,
BR(T;o) = fY g if ￿ c(q) + ￿‘d + ￿ > 0
= fNg if ￿ c(q) + ￿hd + ￿ < 0
= fY;Ng otherwise.
Consider a proposed equilibrium where the payo⁄ of a buyer of type t is denoted U￿
t . According to Cho
and Kreps (1987, p.202), this proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there exists an out-of-
equilibrium o⁄er o0 and a type t 2 T such that:
1. U￿
t > maxr2BR(f‘;hg;o0) Ub(t;o0;r)
2. U￿
~ t < minr2BR(Tnftg;o0) Ub(~ t;o0;r) for all ~ t 2 Tnftg
47According to the ￿rst requirement, the unsent o⁄er o0 would reduce the payo⁄ of the buyer with type t
compared to his equilibrium payo⁄ irrespective of the inference the seller draws from o0. Consequently, the
seller should attribute the o⁄er o0 to a buyer with type ~ t. If he does so, the second requirement speci￿es that
the buyer with type ~ t should obtain a higher utility with o0 compare to his equilibrium payo⁄.
In the bargaining game, the buyer￿ s equilibrium payo⁄is bounded below by 0. Hence, the second condition
implies minr2BR(Tnftg;o0) Ub(~ t;o0;r) > 0, which requires that the o⁄er o0 is acccepted when the seller￿ s belief
is restricted to Tnftg, i.e., Y 2 BR(Tnftg;o0). (Recall from the tie-breaking rule that if fY;Ng = BR
then the seller accepts the o⁄er.) This implies Y 2 BR(f‘;hg;o0), and hence the ￿rst requirement becomes
U￿
t > Ub(t;o0;Y ), i.e., the payo⁄ of the type￿t buyer at the proposed equilibrium is greater than what he
would obtain if he would make the o⁄er o0 and the o⁄er was accepted. This leads to the de￿nition in the
text according to which a proposed equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion if there is an out-of-equilibrium
o⁄er that satis￿es (14)-(16).
Undefeated sequential equilibria
Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) proposed an alternative to the Intuitive Criterion. Their
re￿nement is based on the notion of undefeated equilibrium.
An equilibrium is composed of a strategy for buyers, o, that speci￿es an o⁄er for each type, an acceptance
rule for sellers, r, and a belief system for sellers, ￿. According to Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1993, p.254, De￿nition 2) an equilibrium (o￿ ;r￿ ;￿
0) defeats (o;r;￿) if there exists an o⁄er o0 such that:
1. For all t, o(t) 6= o0 and K ￿ ft 2 T jo0(t) = o0g 6= ?
2. For all t 2 K, Ub [t;o0;r0(o0)] ￿ Ub [t;o(t);r(o(t))] with a strict inequality for one t in K
3. ￿(tjo0) 6= p(t)￿(t)=
X
t0
p(t0)￿(t0) for at least one t in K where p(t) = 1 if t 2 K and Ub [t;o0;r0(o0)] >
Ub [t;o(t);r(o(t))] and p(t) = 0 if t = 2 K.
For a sequential equilibrium to be defeated there must exist an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er that is used in an
alternative sequential equilibrium by a subset K of buyers￿types (requirement 1). For all buyers with types
in K, their payo⁄ at the alternative equilibrium must be greater than the one at the proposed equilibrium
with a strict inequality for at least one type (requirement 2). Finally, the belief system in the proposed
equilibrium does not update sellers￿prior belief conditional on the buyer￿ s type being in K (requirement 3).
48C. Undefeated monetary equilibria
In this section I determine a condition on the in￿ ation rate under which the equilibrium outcome obtained
by using the Intuitive Criterion is robust to the use of the alternative re￿nement of Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara
and Postlewaite (1993).36
Consider two sequential equilibria of the bargaining game, a proposed equilibrium (o;r;￿) and an al-
ternative equilibrium (o￿ ;r￿ ;￿
0), where o: T ! R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] speci￿es an o⁄er for each type,
r: R+ ￿ [￿as;ab] ￿ [￿zs;zb] ! fY;Ng is an acceptance rule for sellers, and ￿ a belief system for sellers.
(See the Appendix B for a de￿nition of the sequential equilibrium of the game.) Let Ub
h denote the payo⁄
of the h-type buyer at the proposed equilibrium and Ub
‘ the payo⁄ of the ‘-type buyer. Consider an out-of-
equilibrium o⁄er ~ o = (~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) (o(t) 6= ~ o for all t 2 T) such that o￿ (t) = ~ o for all t 2 K ￿ T with K 6= ?,
i.e., the out-of-equilibrium o⁄er is made by some types of buyers in the alternative equilibrium. If K is the
singleton ftg, then the proposed equilibrium (o;r;￿) is defeated by (o￿ ;r￿ ;￿
0) if
u(~ q) ￿ ￿t ~ d ￿ ~ ￿ > Ub
t . (58)
The payo⁄ of the buyer of type t is strictly greater at the alternative equilibrium than at the proposed
equilibrium. The reason for why the buyer of type t does not o⁄er ~ o at the proposed equilibrium is because
the seller does not attribute this o⁄er to a t￿type buyer with probability one, i.e., ￿(tj~ o) < 1. (All through
the analysis I assume the tie-breaking rule according to which sellers accept o⁄ers that make them indi⁄erent
between accepting and rejecting.) Consequently, the proposed equilibrium is defeated.
Consider next the case where K = f‘;hg, the alternative equilibrium is pooling. Then, the proposed
equilibrium (o;r;￿) is defeated by (o￿ ;r￿ ;￿
0) if
u(~ q) ￿ ￿t ~ d ￿ ~ ￿ > Ub
t for all t 2 f‘;hg: (59)
The o⁄er is rejected at the proposed equilibrium because ￿(tj~ o) 6= ￿h. If the inequality above is weak for
one type t, then the proposed equilibrium is defeated if ￿(tj~ o) > ￿(t), i.e., the o⁄er should not be attributed
to the type who is indi⁄erent with a probability greater than the occurrence of this type.
36As Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993, p.265) put it,
￿[T]here is no reason that di⁄erent re￿nements shouldn￿ t be employed in the analysis of a single game. Various
implausibilities may be exhibited in di⁄erent equilibria of a game, and hence, considering di⁄erent re￿nements of
the equilibrium set for a single game is like looking at the game from di⁄erent vantage points￿.
49Lemma 5 Consider a match between a buyer holding zb real balances and ab units of the real asset and a
seller holding zs real balances and as units of the real asset. The (separating) equilibrium of the bargaining
game that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion is the only undefeated equilibrium if
￿ Ub
h ￿ u(qp) ￿ ￿hdp ￿ ￿p < Ub
h ￿ u(qh) ￿ ￿hdh ￿ ￿h; (60)
where (qh;dh;￿h) is the solution to (20)-(23) and
(qp;dp;￿p) = argmax
q;d;￿
fu(q) ￿ ￿hd ￿ ￿g (61)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + (￿h￿h + ￿‘￿‘)d + ￿ ￿ 0 (62)












. If ￿ Ub
h > Ub
h then there is an undefeated equilibrium and it is pooling. If
￿ Ub
h = Ub
h then there is both a pooling and a separating undefeated equilibrium.
Proof. A solution to (61)-(64) exists. To see this, notice that (q‘;d‘;￿‘) with d‘ ￿ 0 satis￿es (62)-(64)
so that the set of o⁄ers that satisfy (62)-(64) is not empty and it is compact. The objective function in (61)
being continuous a solution exists.
First, I establish that among the separating sequential equilibria, the only one that can be undefeated is
the one that satis￿es the Intuitive Criterion. Consider a sequential equilibrium that is separating and denote
^ Ub
h the payo⁄ of the h-type buyer at this equilibrium. Suppose that the o⁄er (^ qh; ^ dh;^ ￿h) of the h-type at the
proposed equilibrium is di⁄erent from (qh;dh;￿h) that solves (20)-(23) so that ^ Ub
h < Ub
h = u(qh)￿￿hdh￿￿h.
From (58) the proposed equilibrium is defeated.
Second, suppose (60) holds. From (61)-(64), ￿ Ub
h is the highest payo⁄ an h-type buyer can reach at a
pooling equilibrium. Hence, from (58), any pooling equilibrium is defeated by the Pareto-e¢ cient separating
equilibrium.
Third, suppose that ￿ Ub
h > Ub
h. The pooling equilibrium (qp;dp;￿p) defeats the Pareto-e¢ cient separating
equilibrium. To see this, notice that the h-type buyer strictly prefers the pooling equilibrium while ‘-
type buyers prefer weakly the pooling equilibrium. Hence, ￿(hj(qp;dp;￿p)) should be at least equal to ￿h
at the separating equilibrium, in which case h-type buyers would have a pro￿table deviation. Moreover,
50since (qp;dp;￿p) is the preferred equilibrium of the h-type buyer it cannot be defeated by another pooling
equilibrium.
Fourth, if ￿ Ub
h = Ub
h then both the Pareto-e¢ cient separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium
(qp;dp;￿p) are undefeated by a similar reasoning as above.
Following Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993), the lexicographically maximum sequential
equilibrium (LMSE) corresponds to the pooling o⁄er (qp;dp;￿p) if ￿ Ub
h ￿ Ub
h, and to the separating equilibrium
given by the Intuitive Criterion otherwise.37 Lemma 5 shows that the LMSE is undefeated (Mailath et al.,
1993, Theorem 1) and if it is completely separating, it is the only undefeated (pure strategy) sequential
equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993, Theorem 2). In the following, I assume that in every match where a buyer
and a seller bargain over the terms of trade the equilibrium of the bargaining game corresponds to the LMSE.
The de￿nition of a symmetric equilibrium for the whole economy when the outcome of the bargaining
games in all bilateral matches corresponds to the LMSE is as follows.














(i) (ab;zb) is solution to (10) and (as;zs) is solution to (11);
(ii) If (60) holds then (q￿
h;d￿
h;￿￿
h) is solution to (20)-(23) and (q￿
‘;d￿
‘;￿￿







‘) = (qp;dp;￿p) solution to (61)-(64).
(iii) ￿ solves (36);
(iv) Z = zb + zs.
Since the seller￿ s participation constraint is binding in all matches, the seller￿ s choice of portfolio solves
(35), i.e.,











As in Proposition 4, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ in any equilibrium. So I focus on equilibria where (zs;as) = (0;0).
Next I characterize the solution to (61)-(64) omitting the constraint (63). The constraint (63) is needed
to guarantee that the pooling outcome can be sustained for some beliefs (e.g., ￿(hj(q;d;￿)) = 0 for all
(q;d;￿) 6= (qp;dp;￿p)). However, if (60) is violated this constraint is automatically satis￿ed. To see this,
37Consider two sequential equilibria with the associated pro￿le of payo⁄s for the buyers (uh;u‘) and (u0
h;u0
‘). The ￿rst
equilibrium lexicographically dominates the second one if uh > u0
h or uh = u0
h and u‘ > u0
‘.
51notice that any solution to (61)-(62)-(64) with as = 0 (and hence d ￿ 0) is such that (21) is not binding.
Consequently, if (60) does not hold then (22) must be violated.
Let ^ q be the solution to u0(q) = ￿h
￿ ￿ c0(q).
Lemma 6 The solution to
(~ q; ~ d;~ ￿) = argmax
q;d;￿
fu(q) ￿ ￿hd ￿ ￿g (65)









1. If zb ￿ c(q￿) then ~ q = q￿, ~ d = 0 and ~ ￿ = c(q￿).
2. If zb 2 [c(^ q);c(q￿)) then ~ q = c￿1(zb), ~ d = 0 and ~ ￿ = zb.
3. If zb < c(^ q) and ￿ ￿ab + zb ￿ c(^ q) then ~ q = ^ q, ~ d =
￿
c(^ q) ￿ zb￿
=￿ ￿ and ~ ￿ = zb.
4. If ￿ ￿ab + zb < c(^ q) then ~ q = c￿1(￿ ￿ab + zb), ~ d = ab and ~ ￿ = zb.





u ￿ c￿1 (￿ ￿d + ￿) ￿ ￿hd ￿ ￿
￿
s.t. 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ zb and 0 ￿ d ￿ ab
(i) If the constraint ￿ ￿ zb is not binding then the ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿ gives q = q￿
and the ￿rst-order condition with respect to d gives d = 0. From (66) ￿ = c(q￿). The condition ￿ ￿ zb can
then be rewritten as c(q￿) ￿ zb.
(ii) If both ￿ ￿ zb and d ￿ 0 are binding then q = c￿1(zb). The ￿rst-order condition for ￿ implies
u0(q)=c0(q) ￿ 1, i.e., q ￿ q￿, and the ￿rst-order condition for d implies u0(q)=c0(q) ￿ ￿h=￿ ￿, i.e., q ￿ ^ q.
(iii) If only ￿ ￿ zb is binding then q = ^ q and, from (66), d =
￿
c(^ q) ￿ zb￿
=￿ ￿. The condition 0 ￿ d ￿ ab
implies c(^ q) ￿ ￿ ￿ab ￿ zb ￿ c(^ q).
(iv) If both ￿ ￿ zb and d ￿ ab are binding then q = c￿1(zb + ￿ ￿ab). From the ￿rst-order condition for d,
q ￿ ^ q and hence zb + ￿ ￿ab ￿ c(^ q).
52A key feature of the pooling outcome is that if the buyer￿ s real balances are large enough to allow him
to consume q 2 [^ q;q￿) (part 2 of Lemma 6) then the buyer chooses not to spend any of his real asset. I will
use this result to show that if the buyer￿ s real balances are su¢ ciently large, then the separating equilibrium
given by the Intuitive Criterion is undefeated.
Lemma 7 For all matches where ab > 0 and zb 2 [c(^ q);c(q￿)), where ^ q is the solution to u0(q) = ￿h
￿ ￿ c0(q),
the unique undefeated equilibrium of the bargaining game is separating.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that (60) is violated so that the LMSE corresponds to
the pooling outcome (qp;dp;￿p). From Lemma 6, if zb 2 [c(^ q);c(q￿)) then dp = 0. The solution (qh;dh;￿h)
to (20)-(23) is such that dh > 0 and qh = c￿1(zb + ￿hdh). Hence, u(qh) ￿ c(qh) > u(qp) ￿ c(qp) where
qp = c￿1(zp). A contradiction.
The following Proposition makes use of Lemma 7 to show that the equilibrium outcome when the LMSE
is imposed in all matches is identical to the equilibrium outcome when the Intuitive Criterion is applied to
the bargaining games in all matches provided that the in￿ ation rate is not too large.
Proposition 9 There is i0 > 0 such that for all i 2 (0;i0) the equilibrium outcome under the undefeated
criterion is identical to the one obtained under the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof. From Lemma 7 if zb ￿ c(^ q) then the LMSE of the bargaining game is separating. Suppose that
the buyer chooses a portfolio (zb;ab) such that the outcome of the bargaining game is pooling and equal to
(qp;dp;￿p). Then, zb < c(^ q) and, from Lemma 6, qp ￿ ^ q. The expected surplus of the buyer net of the cost
of holding his portfolio is then
￿izb ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
ab + u(qp) ￿ c(qp) ￿ u(^ q) ￿ c(^ q):






￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
a + ￿hSh(z;a) + ￿‘S‘(z;a)
￿
;
where Sh(z;a) and S‘(z;a) are the surplus functions obtained under the separating outcome of the bargaining
game and ￿ is the equilibrium price at the equilibrium under the Intuitive Criterion. From (38),





53where, from the proof of Proposition 4, zb(i) is a continuous function of i and limi!0 zb(i) = c(q￿). The
function ￿ is continuous, limi!0 ￿(i) = u(q￿) ￿ c(q￿) > u(^ q) ￿ c(^ q). Hence, there exists a nonempty, open
interval (0;i0) such that ￿(i) > u(^ q) ￿ c(^ q) and zb(i) > c(^ q). The buyer chooses a portfolio that correspond
to a separating equilibrium of the bargaining game, and any portfolio corresponding to a pooling outcome





ab + u(qp) ￿ c(qp), that is
smaller than the one obtained under the separating outcome.
This last Proposition suggests that the separating outcome predicted by the Intuitive Criterion is con-
sistent with other re￿nements for signaling games provided that the in￿ ation is not too large.
54D. Asset pricing under symmetric information
In order to isolate the role of the private information friction for liquidity and asset prices, I analyze in this
Appendix the economy with symmetric information: buyers and sellers in the DM have the same information
about the future dividend of the asset.
Complete information
Consider a match in the DM between a buyer and a seller. The buyer holds zb real balances (expressed in
terms of the next CM output) and ab units of the real asset. The seller holds zs real balances and as units
of the real asset. The future dividend of each unit of capital is ￿ and it is common knowledge in the match.
The strategy of a buyer in the DM is a triple (q;d;￿) solution to
(q;d;￿) = argmax
q;￿;d
[u(q) ￿ ￿d ￿ ￿] (68)
s.t. ￿ c(q) + ￿d + ￿ ￿ 0; (69)
s.t. ￿ zs ￿ ￿ ￿ zb; ￿as ￿ d ￿ ab: (70)
If ￿ab+zb ￿ c(q￿) then the solution to (68)-(70) is q = q￿ and ￿d+￿ = c(q￿). Otherwise, q = c￿1(￿ab+zb),
d = ab and ￿ = zb. Let denote ^ S
￿
￿ab + zb￿





Following the same reasoning as in the text, the buyer￿ s portfolio choice in the CM is:





￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
a + ￿h ^ S(z + ￿ha) + ￿‘ ^ S(z + ￿‘a)
￿
; 8j 2 B (71)
where i = (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿ is the cost of holding real balances, and (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿ represents the cost of investing in
the real asset. Similarly, the seller￿ s portfolio decision in the CM is










; 8j 2 S: (72)




a(j)dj = A: (73)





55An equilibrium is a list of portfolios, a pro￿le of buyers￿o⁄ers in the DM, aggregate real balances, and
the price of capital that satisfy (68)-(74).
From (72) the seller￿ s portfolio choice is such that z(j) = 0 (since i > 0), a(j) = 0 if ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ and
a(j) 2 [0;1) if ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. The following lemma characterizes the buyer￿ s portfolio choice.
Lemma 8 Assume ￿ > ￿￿ ￿. If (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ 6= i or ￿‘ ^ S
0
[￿‘c(q￿)=￿h] < i then the buyer￿ s problem (71)
admits a unique solution. It satis￿es
￿i + ￿h ^ S
0
(z + ￿ha) + ￿‘ ^ S
0
(z + ￿‘a) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if z > 0 (75)
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
+ ￿h￿h ^ S
0
(z + ￿ha) + ￿‘￿‘ ^ S
0
(z + ￿‘a) ￿ 0 ￿ = ￿ if a > 0: (76)
If (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ = i and ￿‘ ^ S
0
[￿‘c(q￿)=￿h] ￿ i then any (z;a) such that ￿‘ ^ S
0
(z+￿‘a) = i and z+￿ha ￿ c(q￿)
is solution to (71). If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ then any (z;a) 2 f0g ￿ [c(q￿)=￿‘;1) is solution to (71). Finally, if ￿ < ￿￿ ￿
then there is no solution to (71).
Proof. Since ^ S
0




, then ^ S is concave and the
buyer￿ s problem (71) is concave as well. The ￿rst-order conditions (75) and (76) are then necessary and
su¢ cient. Three cases are distinguished.
(i) ￿ > ￿￿ ￿. The solution to (71) cannot be such that z + ￿‘a > c(q￿). Indeed, if z + ￿‘a > c(q￿) then
^ S
0
(z + ￿ha) = ^ S
0
(z + ￿‘a) = u0(q￿)=c0(q￿) ￿ 1 = 0. But then (75)-(76) imply z = a = 0. A contradiction.
So, one can restrict (z;a) to the compact set f(z;a) 2 R2+ : z + ￿‘a ￿ c(q￿)g and from the Theorem of the
Maximum a solution to (71) exists. Next, I show that the problem (71) is strictly jointly concave for all





h + ￿‘ ^ S
00
‘ ￿h￿h ^ S
00

















h ￿ ^ S
00
(z +￿ha) and ^ S
00
‘ ￿ ^ S
00
(z +￿‘a). For all (z;a) such that ￿ha+z < c(q￿), ^ S
00




jHj = (￿h ￿ ￿‘)





So, H is negative de￿nite and any solution to (75)-(76) such that z + ￿ha < c(q￿) corresponds to a strict
local maximum and hence, from the concavity of the objective, it corresponds to the global maximum.
56Suppose next that the solution is such that z + ￿ha ￿ c(q￿). Then, ^ S
0
(z + ￿ha) = 0 and from (75)-(76),
￿‘ ^ S
0
(z + ￿‘a) = min
￿
i;




with z = 0 if i >
(￿￿￿￿ ￿)
￿￿‘ and a = 0 if i <
(￿￿￿￿ ￿)
￿￿‘ . If i =
(￿￿￿￿ ￿)
￿￿‘ then any pair (z;a) such that z+￿ha ￿ c(q￿)
and ￿‘ ^ S
0






(ii) ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. The ￿rst-order condition for a requires ^ S
0
(z + ￿ha) = ^ S
0
(z + ￿‘a) = 0 and hence any
a ￿ [c(q￿) ￿ z]=￿‘ is part of a solution. But then (75) implies z = 0. Thus, a 2 [c(q￿)=￿‘;1).
(iii) ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ then the ￿rst-order condition for a admits no solution.
The following proposition establishes the existence of an equilibrium and the uniqueness of the price of
the real asset and the allocation of the DM output conditional on the realization of ￿.38 Denote q‘ and qh
the output levels in the DM when ￿ = ￿‘ and ￿ = ￿h, respectively.
Proposition 10 There exists an equilibrium, and (￿;q‘;qh) is uniquely determined. If A ￿ c(q￿)=￿‘ then
the equilibrium is nonmonetary (Z = 0) and ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. If A < c(q￿)=￿‘ then ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ and there is i0 > 0 such
that for all i < i0 an equilibrium is monetary (Z > 0).




a(j)dj : a(j) solution to (71) or (72)
￿
:
Second, it shows that ￿ is uniquely determined. Third, it establishes that the DM output levels, q‘ and qh,
are unique. Finally, it determines the conditions for ￿at money to be valued.
(i) Existence. Consider ￿rst the case ￿ > ￿￿ ￿. The solution to (72) is such that a(j) = 0 for all
j 2 S. As shown in the proof of Lemma 8 (Part (i)), any solution (z;a) to (71) lies in the compact set
[0;c(q￿)] ￿ [0;c(q￿)=￿‘]. Since the objective in (71) is continuous, the Theorem of the Maximum guarantees
that Ad(￿) is nonempty and upper-hemi continuous. Since the objective in (71) is concave, Ad(￿) is convex-
valued. From (75) and (76), it can be checked that Ad(￿) = f0g for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿h and Ad(￿) = fag
where a > 0 solves
￿h￿h ^ S
0
(￿ha) + ￿‘￿‘ ^ S
0
(￿‘a) =
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
38Buyers￿portfolios are not always uniquely determined. If (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ = i, and provided that ^ S
0
(z + ￿ha) = 0, real
balances and capital are perfect substitutes. If ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ then buyers hold any quantity of capital above the level that satiates
their liquidity needs in the DM, ^ S
0
= 0, and they hold no real balances.
57for all ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿‘ (since z = 0). Moreover, a ! c(q￿)=￿‘ as ￿ ! ￿￿ ￿. Consider next the case ￿ = ￿￿ ￿.
For all j 2 S, a(j) 2 [0;1). From Lemma 8, Ad(￿￿ ￿) = [c(q￿)=￿‘;1). Hence, from this characterization of
Ad(￿), there is a ￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿;￿￿ ￿ + i￿￿h] such that A 2 Ad(￿).
(ii) Uniqueness. In order to prove that ￿ is uniquely determined, I show that any selection from Ad is
decreasing in ￿ for all ￿ > ￿￿ ￿: if a1 2 Ad(￿1) and a2 2 Ad(￿2) for ￿2 > ￿1 then a2 < a1 unless a2 = a1 = 0.















where ￿(z;a) ￿ ￿iz + ￿ ￿a + ￿h ^ S(z + ￿ha) + ￿‘ ^ S(z + ￿‘a). These last two inequalities yield
￿1(a1 ￿ a2) ￿ ￿ [￿(z1;a1) ￿ ￿(z2;a2)] ￿ ￿2 (a1 ￿ a2):
Since ￿2 > ￿1 then a1 ￿ a2. Suppose a1 = a2 > 0. From (76), z2 < z1 (where I have used that ^ S
0
< 0 if
z + ￿a < c(q￿)). But z1 6= z2 is inconsistent with (75). A contradiction.
(iii) The allocation (q‘;qh). From (i) and (ii), there exists a unique ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ such that A 2 Ad(￿). If
A ￿ c(q￿)=￿‘ then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿. Since a(j) ￿ c(q￿)=￿‘ for all j 2 B then qh = q‘ = q￿. If A < c(q￿)=￿‘ then ￿ > ￿￿ ￿
and, from Lemma 8, (zb;ab) is uniquely determined unless (￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)=￿￿‘ = i and ￿‘ ^ S
0
[￿‘c(q￿)=￿h] ￿ i in






and qh = q￿. (See proof of Lemma 8.) For given (zb;ab) the problem
(68)-(69) determines uniquely qh and q‘.
(iv) Suppose an equilibrium is nonmonetary. Then, z(j) = 0 and a(j) is the unique solution to (76) for
all j 2 B. Hence, a(j) = A. From (75) Z = 0 implies
￿i + ￿h ^ S
0
(￿hA) + ￿‘ ^ S
0
(￿‘A) ￿ 0:
De￿ne i0 = ￿h ^ S
0
(￿hA) + ￿‘ ^ S
0
(￿‘A). By the contrapositive, if i < i0 then the equilibrium is monetary.
Provided that ￿‘A < c(q￿), ^ S
0
(￿‘A) > 0 and i0 > 0. Finally, if ￿‘A ￿ c(q￿) then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ and Z = 0.
If the economy-wide stock of real assets is large enough to allow agents to trade q￿ in the DM for the
lowest realization of ￿ then ￿at money is not valued.39 If the aggregate stock of real assets is too low relative
39This result is in accordance with Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) who show that money is useful in the presence of capital in
the Lagos-Wright environment if the ￿rst-best level of capital stock provides enough wealth for agents to trade the ￿rst best
level of output in the DM, i.e., there is no shortage of capital to be used as means of payment.
58to agents￿liquidity needs (in terms of means of payment) then the price of the real asset increases above its
fundamental value and ￿at money can be valued provided that i is su¢ ciently low.
The expression for the price of the real asset in equilibrium is obtained from (71) by taking the ￿rst order
condition for a, i.e.,













It has two components. The ￿rst component is its fundamental value, ￿￿ ￿. The second component is the
liquidity value of capital in the DM, the last two terms on the right-hand side of (77). This liquidity value
arises because capital can help relaxing buyers￿budget constraint in a bilateral match.
To determine the liquidity value of ￿at money, take the ￿rst-order condition of (71) with respect to z,














The cost of holding ￿at money, the left side of (78), is equal to the liquidity value of money in the DM in
both states, the right side of (78).
The next proposition compares the (gross) rates of return of money and the real asset, Rz = ￿￿1 and
Ra = ￿ ￿=￿, respectively. Let ￿ denote the covariance between the return of the real asset, ￿, and the marginal
return of wealth in the DM, [u0(q)=c0(q) ￿ 1], i.e.,





















Proof. The expression for ￿ given by (77) can be rearranged as
￿ = ￿
￿



























in any monetary equilib-
rium. Substitute ￿ by its expression given by (79) into (81) to get
￿ = ￿(1 + i)￿ ￿
￿
￿




59Divide by ￿ ￿ and use the de￿nition ￿ = ￿(1 + i) to get (80). In order to show that Ra > Rz it is enough
to establish that ￿ < 0. Notice that ￿h (￿h ￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿‘ (￿‘ ￿ ￿ ￿) = 0. From (75), and since ^ S
00
(￿a + z) < 0
whenever ^ S
0
(￿a + z) > 0, in any monetary equilibrium 0 ￿ ^ S
0
(￿ha + z) < ^ S
0




















and ￿ < 0.
The real asset has a higher rate of return than ￿at money in any monetary equilibrium. This result holds
even though agents are risk-neutral with respect to their CM consumption. This rate-of-return di⁄erential
arises because of the negative correlation between the marginal utility of wealth in the DM and the dividend
of the real asset, i.e., the real asset yields a high dividend in matches when the marginal value of wealth in
the DM is low, and a low dividend in matches where the marginal value of wealth is high.40 In contrast,
the value of money is constant and uncorrelated with the marginal utility of wealth in the DM. Finally, as
￿h ￿ ￿‘ ! 0 then ￿ ! 0 and Ra = ￿￿1, i.e., money and capital have the same rate of return.
Incomplete information
I now describe succinctly the case where both buyers and sellers are uninformed about the future value of ￿.





a+ ^ S(z+￿ ￿a). If A < c(q￿)=￿ ￿ then ￿ > ￿￿ ￿
and there is i0 > 0 such that for all i < i0 an equilibrium is monetary. Moreover, if a monetary equilibrium
exists then ￿ = ￿￿ ￿(1+i) and 1+i = u0(q)=c0(q) where q is the quantity produced and consumed in bilateral
matches in the DM. In this case, Ra = Rz, i.e., ￿at money and capital have the same rate of return.
40This result is analogous to the one in Lagos (2006) who ￿nds that even in the absence of legal restrictions on the use of
assets as means of payment his model can be consistent with an equity-premium puzzle, i.e., a too large return di⁄erential
between bonds and equity.
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